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ARTICLE
NECESSARY AND PROPER, BUT STILL
UNCONSTITUTIONAL: THE OIL
POLLUTION ACT'S DELEGATION OF
ADMIRALTY POWER TO THE STATES
Matthew P. Harringtont
When the Exxon Valdez fetched up on Bligh Reef in Alaska
in 1989, the nation's attention was focused on the problem of oil
spill liability and compensation as never before. The national out-
cry that accompanied televised pictures of oil-stained beaches and
dead or dying wildlife prompted Congress to undertake a review of
the nation's oil spill laws. Fifteen years of congressional confusion
and inaction evaporated overnight, and a consensus rarely seen in
Congress developed to produce a dramatic overhaul of federal oil
pollution legislation. The result was the Oil Pollution Act of 1990
(OPA), which was designed to serve as the foundation of a pack-
age of complementary international, national, and state laws intend-
ed to "adequately compensate victims of oil spills [and] provide
quick, efficient cleanup."
OPA contains several provisions that bring the nation much
closer to this goal: It provides strict liability with increased liability
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Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2761 (1994); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 9509 (1994)).
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limits on those responsible for oil spills; it broadens the rights and
remedies afforded those injured by pollution damage; it creates a
fund designed to ensure adequate compensation for those unable to
recover the costs of cleanup or other damage from the dischargers
of oil; and it tightens operation and construction requirements ap-
plicable to vessels transporting oil in American waters.
OPA seeks to balance the need to make industries which
benefit from the transport of oil internalize the costs of pollution,
while at the same time avoiding the possibility that responsible
vessel owners will be driven from the industry with crippling dam-
age awards. OPA thus provides for strict, but limited, liability. But
in its desire to be tough on spillers, Congress went too far. Con-
gress succumbed to the hysteria surrounding the Exxon Valdez
incident, and with a single, superficially simple provision, upset
this balance by permitting states to impose unlimited strict liability
on vessels which discharge oil into state waters.
In drafting the OPA, Congress explicitly chose not to preempt
state action. Congress included a "non-preemption" clause which is
designed to preserve the right of states to legislate over matters of
local concern. The result, however, has been a confusing array of
inconsistent state legislation, subjecting vessel owners to varying,
and even inconsistent, liability regimes. The uniformity so long
thought to be essential to the development of the maritime law is
impaired. More importantly, OPA's "non-preemption" clause is
unconstitutional, because delegation of power to the states leads to
a lack of uniformity impermissible under the Constitution's Admi-
ralty Clause.
,Uniformity in admiralty law has long been thought to be a
constitutional imperative. Until recently, the Supreme Court- invali-
dated both state and federal legislation having the potential to
disrupt uniformity. Although several recent Supreme Court cases
seem to discount the necessity for uniformity in admiralty law, it is
nevertheless clear that the primary purpose of the constitutional
grant of admiralty power to the federal government was to ensure
the application of a uniform substantive admiralty law throughout
the nation. Indeed, the concern for uniformity behind the
Constitution's grant to the federal government of power over inter-
state and foreign commerce was intensified in the field of maritime
law. The Framers' experience under the Articles of Confederation
taught them that a lack of uniformity in maritime law would not
only inhibit the growth of commerce, but would engender conflicts
in the United States' relations with foreign nations. They set out to
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ensure that the administration of maritime law would be uniform
throughout the nation. In vesting power over admiralty matters in
the federal government, rather than the states, the founding genera-
tion expected the national government to be a bulwark against
intrusion by the states.
OPA's failure to preempt state action is a chink in the armor
of uniformity, opening the way to a myriad of local regulations on
shipping. Rather than creating a comprehensive and complementary
regime, OPA has created a situation in which a vessel owner's
liability for oil pollution will depend on the locality of the spill.
This uneven regulatory scheme has resulted in substantive and
procedural complications. A substantive problem arises because
different states have imposed different liability regimes: Some im-
pose unlimited liability, others have a statutory limit on liability.
Furthermore, some states permit recovery for pure economic loss,
while others do not. The defenses available to shipowners whose
vessels are involved in spills are also variable. Adding to the con-
fusion are the non-statutory claims which survive OPA, each with
its own jurisdictional basis, and each with its own defenses and
liability limits.
This chaos is exacerbated by a provision in OPA which pre-
empts the shipowners' right to limitation under the Shipowners'
Limitation of Liability Act.3 While a number of courts and com-
mentators have criticized the substantive provisions of the Limita-
tion of Liability Act, its procedural value is significant because it
allows the joinder of all claims into a single proceeding. The Limi-
tation of Liability Act prevents a "race to the courthouse" and
provides a means by which the available assets may be divided
equitably. OPA, in contrast, has failed to provide any means for
consolidating claims arising from an oil pollution incident into a
single forum. As a result, not only are substantive liabilities subject
to variation, but a single spill can engender litigation in several
fora, raising the potential for inconsistent judgments.
This article will show that the provision permitting states to
enact oil spill statutes that impose different, potentially greater,
liabilities than those permitted by OPA itself is an unconstitutional
delegation of the admiralty power. Part I will examine the statutory
regime applicable to oil pollution incidents. It will highlight the
3- Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-
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basic provisions of the various federal oil pollution statutes, paying
particular attention on the remedies provided by OPA. Part II will
focus to the constitutional requirement for uniformity in maritime
law. It will show that any legislation that delegates admiralty pow-
er to the states so as to disrupt that uniformity is unconstitutional.
It will first consider Congress's authority under the Commerce
Clause, showing that the decision not to preempt state action is
permissible under the Commerce Clause. It will then consider
OPA's constitutionality in light of the Admiralty Clause. It will
show that the admiralty power was granted by the Constitution
primarily to ensure uniformity in the maritime law, and that for
this reason the Admiralty Clause bars any delegation of the admi-
ralty power by Congress. Part I will examine the substantive and
procedural difficulties created by OPA's non-preemption clause, as
a means of illustrating the wisdom of the doctrine of uniformity in
admiralty.
I. THE STATUTORY REGIME
A. Federal Legislation Prior to OPA
Prior to the Exxon Valdez disaster of 1989, the United States
had several statutes designed to combat and clean up oil pollution
incidents. These included the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,4 the
Oil Pollution Act of 1924,' the Clean Waters Restoration Act of
Rivers and Harbors Appropriation Act of 1899, ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1121 (1899) (cod-
ified in scattered sections of Title 33, U.S.C.). This Act imposes penalties on vessel own-
ers who discharge refuse into the navigable waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. §
407 (1994). Oil is considered "refuse" within the terms of the Act. See United States v.
Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224, 229-30 (1966) ("There is nothing more deserving of the
label 'refuse' than oil spilled into a river."). Violators are subject to a maximum fine of
$25,000. See 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1996) (amending 33 U.S.C. § 411 (1994)) (prior to the
1996 amendment, the Act subjected violators to modest fines of between $500 and
$2,500). Although the Act makes no specific provision for recovery of cleanup costs, the
Supreme Court has held that the federal government's right to recover such costs is im-
plied in the statute. See Wyandotte Transp. Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191, 204
(1967) (holding that the federal government may assert its right to impose financial re-
sponsibility on those who negligently or willfully discharge oil). The Refuse Act is of
limited use in most oil pollution incidents, because it provides no remedy, either express
or implied, to private claimants. See California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287 (1981) (de-
nying an environmental organization and two private citizens the opportunity to enjoin the
State of California from constructing water diversion facilities), vacated, Sierra Club v.
Watt, 451 U.S. 965 (1981).
Oil Pollution Act of 1924, 43 Stat. 604 (1925) (repealed). This Act provided only
for criminal penalties for unauthorized discharges of oil. See id. § 4, 43 Stat. at 605.
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1966,6 the Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, (WQIA),7
and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,
(FWPCA), later known as the Clean Water Act (CWA).' These
acts were generally considered ineffective in controlling oil pollu-
tion and in providing compensation to those damaged by an oil
pollution incident.9
The difficulty with this patchwork regime was that before
OPA, none of the statutes of general application made specific
provision for recovery of cleanup-costs by states or private parties.
The CWA provided for the recovery of cleanup costs incurred by
governments only. Private parties could recover these costs and
damages only by actions in admiralty"0 or by resort to state statu-
33 U.S.C. § 466 (1994).
7" 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)). The
WQIA was an improvement over earlier legislation in that it made a discharger of pollu-
tion strictly liable for cleanup costs, but that liability was limited to the lesser of $100
per ton or $14 million. See id. § 11, 84 Stat. at 94 (1970) (codified as amended at 33
U.S.C. § 1321 (1994)). Such a low liability limit might be effective in only the smallest
spills; a massive spill by a 100,000 ton tanker would subject a vessel owner to a mere
$10 million in liability.
. 86 Stat. 816 (1972) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)).
. The CWA was the primary piece of legislation applicable to oil spill prior to the
passage of the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. It prohibited all discharges of oil or hazardous
substances into the navigable waters of the United States. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3)
(1994). Under the Act, the party responsible for a spill has the primary duty for cleanup.
See id. § 1321(c). However, at least two major problems with the CWA remain.
First, while it provides a right to recover costs incurred by the federal and state
governments for cleanup, it does not address private claims for removal costs. See id. §
1321. States and private citizens are permitted to recover for damage caused to property.
See United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 742 (5th Cir. 1980). In fact,
states are entitled to enact even more stringent liability regimes. See Askew v. American
Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973) (upholding such a statute, passed by
Florida, against the claim that it was preempted by federal law).
The second problem with the CWA is that non-federal claims for damage and recov-
ery are subject to limitation under the Limitation of Liability Act. 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-96
(1994). Similarly, the recovery of federal cleanup costs is limited to the amounts stated in
the CWA. See In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327 (2d Cir. 1981) (concluding that
the CWA provides the federal government's exclusive remedy for pollution recovery
costs).
The Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works expressed its displeasure
with the adequacy of the Clean Water Act in its report recommending the passage of
OPA. The Committee complained that "[t]he Act sets inappropriately low limits of liabili-
ty for owners and operators of vessels with respect to Federal oil spill removal costs and
natural damages, and provides no coverage or compensation for other damages." S. REP.
No. 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 724.
'" See generally Stephen E. Roady, Remedies in Admiralty for Oil Pollution, 5 FLA.
ST. U. L. REV. 361 (1977) (explaining how private claimants, in the absence of a state-
created cause of action or a direct suit against the polluters' insurers, are frequently frus-
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tory remedies or common law nuisance actions. 1 Although several
later statutes, such as the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act
(TAPAA), the Deepwater Ports Act (DPA),"3 and the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978 (OCSLAA),' 4
trated in their hopes of recovery for damages resulting from spills).
" See Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Standard Oil Co., 339 F.2d 148 (9th Cir. 1964)
(upholding trial court judgment that the City of Los Angeles and others were liable for
negligent operation of an oil pipeline); In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp.
925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (allowing such an action for an oil spill from a ship). A public
nuisance action, which is based on the sovereign's power to act on behalf of the general
public, was often the most effective means for a state government to obtain cleanup costs,
because it is something akin to a strict liability action, and requires only that the state
show there was an interference with a right common to the general public. See, e.g.,
Pennsylvania v. Barnes & Tucker Co., 353 A.2d 471, 473-74 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1976)
(explaining the rationale behind actions in equity by state governments to abate public
nuisances). Private citizens did not enjoy the same advantages as state governments, how-
ever, and were often forced to bring private nuisance actions to recover damages or clean-
up costs. See, e.g., In re New Jersey Barging Corp., 168 F. Supp. 925, 934-35 (S.D.N.Y.
1958) (allowing beachfront property owners to recover in private nuisance suit). In a pri-
vate nuisance action, the plaintiff is required to show causation and either negligence or
intent. See id. More importantly, such actions do not permit claims based on lost profits
or earning capacity without damage to a proprietary interest. See id.
12- 87 Stat. 584 (1973) (partially repealed, current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 1651-55
(1994)). TAPAA created a $100 million fund financed by a five-cent-per-barrel tax on all
oil passing through the Trans-Alaska pipeline. See 43 U.S.C. § 1653(c)(5) (1994). The
fund is available to pay cleanup costs incurred in a spill. See iL § 1653(c)(3). Vessel
owners are strictly liable for the first $14 million in damages. See Ud. § 1653(c)(1)-(3).
TAPAA permits a broader range of recovery, allowing "all damaged parties, public or
private, without regard to fault for such damages, and without regard to ownership of any
affected lands, structures, fish, wildlife, or biotic or other natural resources. .. " Id.
§ 1653(a)(1).
13 DPA, 88 Stat. 2126 (1975) (partially repealed, current version at 33 U.S.C. §§
1501-1524 (1994)). The DPA applies to spills occurring at ports occurring outside the
three-mile limit. See id. § 3(10), 88 Stat. at 2128, 33 U.S.C. § 1502(10). It originally
created a $4 million fund financed by a two-cent-per-barrel tax on oil loaded or unloaded
at deepwater ports. See id. § 18(t)(3), 88 Stat. at 2143 (repealed 1990). Shipowners were
strictly liable for cleanup costs and damages up to a limit of $150 per gross rate ton or
$20 million, whichever was less. See id. § 18(d), 88 Stat. at 2142 (repealed 1990). More-
over, gross negligence subjected the shipowner to unlimited liability. See id. The DPA
permitted private individuals to maintain suit for damages, and also authorized the U.S.
Attorney General to maintain a class action on behalf of property owners. See id. §
18(i)(1), 88 Stat. at 2144 (repealed 1990).
'4 OCSLAA, 92 Stat. 629 (1978) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 43
U.S.C., and repealed in part by Pub L. No. 101-380, tit. H § 2004, 104 Stat. 507
(1990)). The OCSLAA provided for strict liability for owners and operators of offshore
drilling facilities and on vessels carrying oil from the Outer Continental Shelf. See idL §
304(a), 92 Stat. at 675. The liability of a vessel owner was limited to $250,000 or $300
per gross rate ton, whichever was greater, except when the owner failed to provide all
reasonable assistance in cleaning up the oil, in which case, it was liable in full. See iL §
304(b)(1), 92 Stat at 675. The operator of an offshore facility was liable in full for all
cleanup costs and a maximum of $35 million for damages. See id § 304(b)(2), 92 Stat.
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impose greater liability and permit wider recovery than the statutes
of general application, they are of limited value because they are
applicable only to spills occurring in specific locations. Thus, While
each of these three statutes improved the oil pollution regime as
applied in limited circumstances, they are best regarded as merely
supplemental legislation.
The inadequacies of the FWPCA were subject to a great deal
of criticism." Concern increased as the size of tankers and their
cargoes increased: larger cargoes increased the potential size of
disasters. Congress had long considered altering the federal oil
pollution liability scheme, but legislation remedying the defects
perceived in the earlier statutes lay dormant for several years.'6
A series of catastrophic oil spills in 1989 galvanized congres-
sional support for drastic change in the nation's environmental
laws. The grounding of the Exxon Valdez focused public attention
on the potentially catastrophic nature of oil spills. The Exxon
Valdez spill was closely followed by a series of oil spills, three of
which occurred in the same month. In June 1989, the World Prodi-
gy spill into Narragansett Bay, the Rachel-B spill into the Houston
Ship Channel, and the President Rivera spill into the Delaware
at 676. The OCSLA permitted a wide range of public and private entities to make claims,
including claims for economic loss. See id. § 303(a)(1), (a)(2)(A)-(E), 92 Stat. at 674. The
OCSLA also established a fund of $200 million, financed by a three-cent-per-barrel tax on
oil obtained from the Outer Continental Shelf. See id. § 302(a), (d)(1), 92 Stat. at 672-73.
The fund was used to compensate a claimant when it appeared that the discharger was
incapable of compensating the claimant or when the discharger had paid claims to the
limits of its liability. See id. § 307(d), 92 Stat. at 697.
,x For example, Gilmore and Black wrote:
Mhe Act is as soft and spineless in its drafting as it is muddle-headed in its
policy. If it is destined to remain on the books, the courts will have their work
cut out for them in making some sort of sense out of its vague, ambiguous
and contradictory provisions.
GRANT GILMoRE & CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., Tim LAW OF ADMIRALTY 827-28 (2d ed.
1975); Judith R. Eaton, Note, Oil Spill Liability and Compensation: Tne to Clean Up the
Law,19 Gao. WASH. J. INT'IL. L. & ECON. 787 (1985) (arguing that the FWPCA should
be supplanted by adoption of the International Convention on Civil Liability for Oil Pollu-
tion Damage); Note, Oil Spills and Cleanup Bills: Federal Recovery of Oil Spill Cleanup
Costs, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1761 (1980) (arguing that the FWPCA has led to confusion and
doubtful judicial interpretations).
'6 See Thomas J. Wagner, Recoverable Damages Under the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, 5 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 283 (1993) (describing how the Exxon Valdez disaster pushed
Congress to unanimously enact OPA); Walter B. Jones, Oil Spill Compensation and Lia-
bility Legislation: When Good Things Don't Happen to Good Bills, 19 ENVT'L L. REP.
(Envt'l. L. Inst.) 10, 333 (1989) (providing a historical account of three decades of inade-
quate oil spill legislation).
19971
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
River all occurred in a single twenty-four hour period. These
helped convince Congress that oil pollution from accidental tanker
spills is a continuing threat to the public health and welfare and
the environment.' 7 No environmentalist conspiracy could have
been more effective in bringing about comprehensive oil spill re-
form.'
8
B. The Oil Pollution Act of 1990
In August, 1990, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of
1990, (OPA), 19  which greatly altered the statutory regime
governing oil pollution. OPA abrogated many traditional admiralty
principles in order to increase the resources available to pay pollu-
tion claims. Congress attempted to address the problems of mari-
time transport it believed to have contributed to accidents like the
Exxon Valdez spill." Accidents have frequently influenced federal
maritime policy,2' but few have had as much effect as the Exxon
Valdez spill: OPA, passed in its aftermath, drastically altered the
oil pollution liability regime in ways that have yet to be fully
understood.
OPA's primary aim is to make those engaged in the oil trades
pay the costs of oil pollution incidents.' It uses at least four
17" SEN. REP. No. 101-94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 723.
" See Benjamin H. Grumbles & Joan M. Manley, Comment, The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990: Legislation in the Wake of a Crisis, NAT. RESOURCES & ENV'T, Fall 1995, at
35 (1995). In truth, the events of 1989, were only the latest in a long series of dramatic
oil pollution incidents. On March 18, 1967, the Torrey Canyon was stranded on rocks off
the southwest coast of England, spilling over 60 thousand tons of crude oil into the Eng-
lish Channel. The break-up of the Amoco Cadiz off the coast of France in March 1978
involved the loss of her cargo of 230 thousand tons of oil. See In re Oil Spill by the
Amoco Cadiz off the Coast of France on March 16, 1978, 1984 A.M.C. 2123 (N.D. Ill.
1984). Both incidents served to heighten public awareness of the dangers inherent in the
transport of large quantities of oil products by ship.
" Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 104 Stat. 484 (1990) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C.
§§ 2701-2761 (1994); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4611, 9509 (1994)).
"I Richard D. Stewart, Maritime Safety and Environmental Regulation, in UNITED
STATES SHIPPING POLICIES AND THE WORLD MARKET, at 171, 174 (William A. Lovett
ed., 1996).
21. The sinking of the Titanic in 1912 led to the implementation of the Safety of Life
at Sea (SOLAS) regulations. See id. at 171-72. The Morro Castle disaster of 1934, in
which 124 passengers and crew died in a fire, prompted increased attention to fire safety
regulations as served as the impetus behind the founding of the U.S. Merchant Marine
Academy. See id. at 172. The grounding of the Argo Merchant, along with the subse-
quent loss of her oil cargo, gave added urgency to the passage of the 1977 amendments
to the FWPCA, as well as increased Coast Guard regulation and inspection of vessels in
U.S. ports. See id. at 171-73.
2 The Senate report accompanying the draft legislation contained the following
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methods to do this. First, it implements a "polluter pays" policy by
increasing limits of liability for cleanup costs and by expanding the
types of damages recoverable by governments and private parties.
Second, it increases the role of the federal government in pollution
cleanup and compensation by federalizing oil spill cleanup opera-
tions and by increasing the importance of the federally-maintained
Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund. Third, it places added emphasis on
pollution prevention measures through the use of provisions requir-
ing contingency planning, double hulls, and increased manning and
training. Fourth, it permits states to supplement its provisions with
their own liability and compensation schemes.
1. Making the Polluter Pay
OPA remedies many of the deficiencies of prior law, in that it
(1) increases the limits on the liability to which polluters are sub-
ject, (2) expands the types of parties entitled to make claims, and
(3) broadens the range of damages that may be recovered.
OPA provides that "each responsible party for a vessel or a
facility from which oil is discharged, or which poses the substantial
threat of a discharge of oil, into or upon the navigable waters or
adjoining shorelines or the exclusive economic zone is liable for
the removal costs and damages" incurred as a result of the spill.ra
This language has been taken to impose strict liability, making a
vessel or facility liable in the first instance for all cleanup costs
and damages associated with the spill. In the case of a vessel,
"responsible party" means any person owning, operating, or demise
chartering the vessel2
complaint
[F]our major oil spills within a three-month period suggest that spills are still
too much of an accepted cost of doing business for the oil shipping industry.
At the present time, the costs of spilling and paying for its clean-up and dam-
age is [sic] not high enough to encourage greater industry efforts to prevent
spills and develop effective techniques to contain them. Sound public policy
requires reversal of these costs.
S. REP. No. 101-94, at 3 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 723.
21 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a) (1996).
2 33 U.S.C. § 2701(32)(A) (1996). This phrase is taken directly from the FWPCA
and was not thought to create a great deal of difficulty when used in connection with
that act. The FWPCA in most cases only imposed liability for cleanup costs. Because
there is a very real possibility of unlimited liability under OPA, however, it is expected
that the question of "ownership" will be the subject of a great deal of litigation. In the
shipping world, where a vessel may be owned, demised, chartered and sub-chartered, own-
ership can be a very tenuous thing. See, e.g., id. § 2701(26) (defining the term "owner-
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OPA balances the cost to carriers of strict liability with a limit
on damages. In most cases, OPA caps the liability for removal
costs and damages of a vessel of over 3,000 gross registered tons
(GRT), to the greater of $1,200 per GRT, or $10 million. Tank
vessels of less than 3,000 GRT are capped at the greater of $1,200
per ton or $2 million. Other vessels' liability is capped at the
greater of $600 per GRT, or $500,000.' The statute thus makes it
clear that strict liability does not mean unlimited liability. Costs
and damages in excess of the statutory limits must be recovered
from other sources, such as the Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund or
third parties whose negligence contributed to the spill. This limit
may be critical in the context of large spills: removal costs after
the Exxon Valdez spill have exceeded $2.5 billion.'
OPA's liability limits may be avoided under certain circum-
stances. The most important of these arises when the spill is the
result of "gross negligence or willful misconduct '', on the part of
the responsible party or its employees, agents contractors or ser-
vants. This provision results in unlimited liability to vessel owners
even when the acts causing the incident are the result of negligent
conduct on the part of independent contractors.29 Liability is also
unlimited where the incident is proximately caused by a violation
of a federal safety, construction, or operating regulation. This ex-
ception covers acts undertaken by the potentially responsible party,
its agents, employees, and those carrying out contracts with the
potentially responsible party.'
ship"). However, Coast Guard regulations promulgated in the wake of the Act attempt to
anticipate some of these debates. See 33 C.F.R. § 138.20(b) (1996).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(2) (1996). A "tank vessel" is a vessel that is "constructed
or adapted to carry, or that carries, oil or liquid hazardous material in bulk as cargo or
cargo residue .. " 33 C.F.R. § 138.20(b) (1996). Thus a 100,000 ton tanker would have
a limit of liability of $120,000,000 ($1,200 x 100,000 GRT = $120 million). See 33
U.S.C. § 2704(a) (1996). A tank vessel of 2,000 tons would have a limit of $2,400,000
($1,200 x 2,000 GRT - $2,400,000). See id. § 2704(a)(1)(b). A non-tank vessel of 10,000
tons, such as a dry cargo vessel or container ship, would have a limit of 6,000,000 ($600
x 10,000 GRT - $6,000,000). See id. § 2704(a)(2). Non-tank vessels have lower limits of
liability because they pose less of a danger of a catastrophic spill.
' See infra text accompanying notes 41-43.
2" See Helen R. MacLeod, Exxon Case Goes to Jury, J. OF COM., June 10, 1996, at
8A.
33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(A) (1996).
This provision codifies the result in cases like LeBeouf Bros. Towing v. United
States, 621 F.2d 787 (5th Cir. 1980), in which parties with whom the discharger was in a
contractual relationship were not considered third parties for purposes of the FWPCA's
"sole cause" exceptions to liability. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(g) (1994).
"' See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c)(1)(B) (1996). This exception to the cap appears overly
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There are few defenses available to responsible parties under
OPA. It is a defense that the spill was caused by (1) an act of
God, (2) an act of war, or (3) an act or omission of a third party,
not including an agent, servant, employee, or contractor. 1 The
third party defense is not as broad as it appears, however as, it ex-
cludes from the definition of "third party" those with whom the
potentially responsible party is in privity,32 and it requires the po-
tentially responsible party prove it took all reasonable steps to
protect against foreseeable acts or omissions of the third party.33
OPA not only increases the possibility a polluter will be held
a responsible party, it also expands the range of recoverable dam-
ages. It seeks to enforce the "polluter pays" policy in two ways.
First, OPA provides remedies both to government and to private
parties, thus correcting a major failing of the FWPCA 4 Second,
OPA permits recovery for a broader variety of injuries, including
both removal costs and damages to various governmental and pri-
vate interests. Under OPA both private parties and governments are
entitled to compensation for damage to a wide range of interests.35
The expanded range of recoverable damages, along with the
expansion in the types of parties entitled to make claims furthers
Congress's intent that responsible parties be accountable for all the
consequences of an oil spill 6 This accountability is limited by
broad, but it will be left to the courts to determine exactly how close the nexus must be
between the regulatory violation and the incident. A broad view of the concept of proxi-
mate cause might make limitation under OPA a forlorn hope. Finally, OPA's liability
limits will not apply where the responsible party either fails to report the spill or refuses
to cooperate in its removal. See iUd § 2704(c)(2).
-' See id. § 2703(a)(l)-(3).
31 See id. § 2703(a)(3).
" See id. § 2703(c)(1)(B) (1996). Moreover, even if the potentially responsible party
can show that it is not at fault, it must still pay removal costs and damages to claimants
if the third party refuses to do so. The responsible party is then left to seek indemnity
from the party whose acts caused the spill. See id. § 2702(d)(1)(B). OPA's more limited
defenses are designed to eliminate the ambiguities in the FWPCA.
'" See supra text accompanying note 9.
"'* OPA lists six categories of damages: (1) injury or destruction of natural resources;
(2) loss or injury to real or personal property;, (3) loss of subsistence use of natural re-
sources; (4) the net loss of taxes, royalties; rents, or fees due to a governmental entity
arising from the destruction or loss of natural resources; (5) lost profits or "impairment of
earning capacity" due to the loss or destruction of real or personal property or natural re-
sources, and (6) the net cost of providing increased or additional public services during or
after removal activities. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2702(b)(2)(A)-(F) (1996).
x OPA's liability provisions are strengthened by a requirement that shipowners are
required to obtain a "Certificate of Financial Responsibility" from an insurer or other
guarantor. See 33 U.S.C. § 2716(a) (1996). This Certificate permits direct actions against
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the statutory limits on what a responsible party typically can be re-
quired to pay.37 Moreover, payments made by the responsible par-
ty itself for cleanup count against the statutory limit." Thus, the
owners of a 2,500 ton vessel who spend $8 million cleaning up a
spill can only be required to pay $2 million in removal costs and
damages to government and third parties, regardless of the extent
of such costs outstanding. While a larger vessel may have a higher
liability limit, the total recoverable still may not be adequate to
compensate all claimants.39
OPA balances expanded rights of recovery against limitation
of liability of the responsible party. Congress was concerned that
vessel owners and others engaged in the oil trades should not be
subjected to "potentially crushing liability."'  Unlimited liability
exists only where some fault or negligence can be proved.
Congress, thus, attempted to make responsible parties assume as
much of the burden for prevention and cleanup as possible without
subjecting them to financial ruin. In so doing, it hoped to spare the
federal government an ever-increasing burden of uncompensated
cleanup costs.
2. "Federalizing" Oil Spills
a. The Oil Spill Liability Trust Fund
OPA contains conforming amendments which establish a sin-
gle fund to compensate public and private claimants for cleanup
costs and damages incurred as a result of oil pollution. While
earlier legislation made provision for similar funds, they were
rarely adequate to cover the actual costs resulting from a spill.41
the issuer or guarantor. See id. § 2716(0. However, the guarantor is not liable for any
amounts in excess of that required under the Act. See id. § 2716(g). If an owner has
more than one vessel, the certificate may cover a fleet as long as it is in an amount
large enough to cover the largest vessel. See id § 2716(a).
37. See supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (1996).
'9 A 2,500 ton barge would have a $10 million cap under OPA. See id. § 2704. A
100,000 ton vessel might have a liability cap of $120 million. See id. Yet even this fund
may be inadequate where natural resource damages are involved. See supra text
accompanying note 24.
' United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1980) (inter-
preting the congressional intent in the enacting of the FWPCA).
"' The TAPAA fund had a maximum level of $100 million. See TAPAA § 204(c)(5),
87 Stat. 576, 586-87 (repealed 1990). The OCSLA fund had a limit of $200 million. See
OCSLAA § 302, 92 Stat 629, 629 (repealed 1990). Yet the FWPCA fund is set at a
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OPA consolidated all preexisting oil spill funds into the Oil Spill
Liability Trust Fund (OSLTF).42 The purpose of the OSLTF is to
ensure prompt and efficient cleanup of spills by making funds
immediately available for removal costs. Because it is funded by a
tax on all imported and domestic oil, the OSLTF helps to ensure
that the costs of oil spills are borne by "all users of oil.'" 3
b. Federal Supervision of Cleanup
OPA represents a departure from earlier statutes in that it
requires the federal government to take primary responsibility for
cleanup. Prior to OPA, the EPA and Coast Guard were authorized
to undertake the cleanup only when the discharger refused to take
action." OPA, however, requires that the federal government "co-
ordinate and direct all public and private cleanup efforts whenever
there is a substantial threat of a pollution hazard to the public
maximum of only $35 million. FWPCA § 311(k), 86 Stat 816, 864 (1972) (repealed
1990). More importantly, the FWPCA fund was never funded at the $35 million level.
See S. REP. No. 99-479, at 3 (1986). The DPA fund was originally set at $100 million,
and then decreased to a total of only $4 million. See The Deepwater Port Act Amend-
ments of 1984 § 4(a)(2), 98 StaL 1607, 1608-09 (1984) (repealed 1990); see also Glenn
Fjermedal, Comment, Federal Oil Spill Legislation: A Future Standard, 53 ALB. L. REv.
161, 182-86 (1988) (arguing that then-current oil spill funds were inadequate and should
have been consolidated and increased).
' See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 2002(b), 104 Stat. 484, 507 (1990) (repealing 33
U.S.C. § 1321(k) (1994)); see also id § 2003(b), 104 Stat. at 507 (repealing 33 U.S.C. §
1517 (1994)); § 2004, 104 Stat. at 507; § 8102, 104 Stat. at 565.
S. REP. No. 101-94, at 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 727. The
OSLTF was actually created in 1986 to pay removal costs arising from oil pollution inci-
dents. See Id. The OSLTF was created by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1986 § 8033, 100 Stat. 1874, 1959-62 (1986) (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9509
(1994)). Congress enacted the Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
(SARA), 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), which included provisions authorizing a tax to be used
for maintaining the OSLTF. The OLSTF is financed by a five cent per barrel tax on all'
imported and domestic oil. See 26 U.S.C. § 4611(c)(2)(B) (1994). The OLSTF provides
payment of (1) removal costs incurred by states or the federal government, (2) costs of
assessing natural resources damages and making repairs to damaged areas, (3) claims for
uncompensated removal costs, and (4) costs of implementing and enforcing OPA. See 33
U.S.C. § 2712 (1994). The Coast Guard administers the OSLTF through the National
Pollution Funds Center (NPFC) in Virginia. See Lawrence I. Kiem, The Oil Pollution Act
of 1990 and the National Pollution Funds Center, 25 . MAR. L. & COM. 487 (1994)
(describing the operation of the OSLTF and the administration of the fund by the Coast
Guard). Regulations concerning claims on the Fund are promulgated at 33 C.F.R. § 136
(1996).
' The President is "authorized to remove or arrange for the removal of. .. [oil] at
any time, unless he determines that such removal will be done properly by the owner or
operator of the vessel, onshore facility, or offshore facility from which the discharge oc-
curs:' 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c)(1) (1994).
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health or welfare."'45 OPA also establishes contingency planning
requirements for ports and vessels and creates several new offices
and agencies to consult with the Coast Guard on oil spill recovery
technology and operations.'
3. Pollution Prevention
OPA not only seeks to ensure that oil spills are cleaned up
promptly, it also endeavors to prevent such spills from occurring if
they are at all avoidable. The Act includes provisions intended to
minimize the frequency of spills and to limit their potential to do
damage. These include rules requiring the use of double hulls,47
the suspension of crew members' licenses for alcohol or drug
abuse,' improvements in the Vessel Traffic Service System,49
and modifications to pilotage laws.0
4. Preemption
In drafting OPA, Congress deliberately chose not to preempt
state laws governing oil pollution liability and compensation. OPA
contains a "non-preemption" clause designed to give states the right
to impose greater liability requirements than those in the federal
scheme:
The theory ... is that the Federal statute is designed to
provide basic protection for the environment and victims
damaged by spills of oil. Any state wishing to impose a
greater degree of protection for its own resources and citi-
zens is entitled to do so. On the other hand, a state may'
feel adequately protected by the Federal statute and there-
fore choose not to enact additional state law. In any event,
the Committee chose not to impose, arbitrarily, the con-
straints of the Federal regime on the states while at the
same time preempting their rights to their own laws."
4'- S. REP. No. 101-94, at 8 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 729. This
change is accomplished through conforming amendments to section 311(c) of the Clean
Water Act. See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1994).
' See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 2731 (1994) (creating the Oil Spill Recovery Institute); id. §
2732 (establishing the Oil Terminal Facilities and Oil Tanker Operations Association).
'" See 46 U.S.C. § 3708 (1994).
See id. § 4103 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 7703(2)-(3) (1994)).
'" See 33 U.S.C. § 2734 (1994).
SO See Oil Pollution Act of 1990 § 4108 (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 9302(b) (1994)).
St. 5. REP. No. 101-94, at 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 728.
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Congress included a provision stating that nothing in OPA
should be considered to affect the right of any state to impose
greater liability on a responsible party for oil spill incidents occur-
ring within a state.52 OPA thus explicitly preserves the right of
the states to enact more stringent liability regimes. Permitting states
to legislate in this area was a source of great concern, and OPA
was roundly criticized by many both within and outside the ship-
ping industry because of this decision.53 Most coastal and Great
Lakes states have since passed some form of comprehensive oil
spill liability and compensation legislation. Many of these provide
for unlimited liability for discharges in state waters.54
Congress further provided that states might create their own
compensation funds-similar to the Federal OSLTF-to be funded
and maintained with state taxes on the oil or shipping industry5
This provision goes beyond merely "grandfathering" already-exist-
ing state funds. Rather, it is clear that Congress envisioned that
states would establish new oil spill compensation funds and that
See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994).
5 See Daniel Kopec & H. Philip Peterson, Crude Legislation: Liability and Com-
pensation under the Oil Pollution Act of 1990, 23 RuTGERS LJ. 597, 624-25 (1992) (crit-
icizing the preservation of state authority); see also Robin Buckner Price, U.S. Oil Spill
Law to Cause Growing Tanker Problem, OiL & GAS J., Sept. 30, 1991, at 21 (detailing
criticisms of industry of OPA and predicting that responsible oil carriers would leave the
U.S. trade rather than submit to new regime). But see Janet Porter, Spill Plan Worries
Small Tanker Owners, J. COM., Feb. 14, 1992, at 5B (noting that few oil carriers left the
U.S. market); Oil Industry Announces Formation of Spill Cleanup Response Organization,
21 INT'L ENV'T REP. (B.N.A.) 901 (Sept. 14, 1990) (discussing industry plans to create
Marine Spill Response Corporation, a not-for-profit company formed to provide immediate
spill response capability).
' The vast majority of coastal states have enacted unlimited liability statutes. See
ALA. CODE §§ 22-22-1 to -14 (1990); ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.758 to .759 (Michie
1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8670.25 (West 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-451
(West 1995); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 6208 (1991); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 367.12 (West
1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-5-51 (1996); HAW. REv. STAT. § 128D-6 (1993); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 2004, 2025, (West 1989); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. §§ 551, 552 (West
1989); MD. CODE ANN., ENvut. §§ 4-401, -410 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 21E,
§ 5 (West 1994); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 146A.3-a (1996); NJ. STAT. ANN. § 5858:10-
23.llg (West 1992); N.Y. NAy. LAw § 181 (McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. 143 §
143-215.83 (1996); OR. REV. STAT. § 468B.90 (1995); RI. GEN. LAWS. § 46-12.5-6
(1996); S.C. CODE ANN. § 48-43-580 (Law Co-op. 1987); VA. CODE ANN. § 62.1-
44.34:18 (Michie 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 90-48.336 (West 1992). Texas has a
statute containing liability limits similar in structure to OPA. See Tax. NAT. RES. CODE
ANN. § 40.202 (West 1997). Pennsylvania law gives the commonwealth a cause of action
in nuisance. See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 691-401 (West 1993). Puerto Rico law
gives the commonwealth a chose in action. See P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 24 § 600 (1980).
' See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(b) (1994).
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these funds would be supported by taxing "oil landings. 5 6 States
would be free to set their own rates, and the federal tax rate would
neither be a ceiling nor a floor for state rates.57 The intent behind
this provision is to leave the states flexibility in funding their re-
sponses to oil pollution incidents:
Preemption of the States' funds would compromise a state's
ability to prevent or limit oil spill damage to the natural
resources and property of its citizens. Unfortunately, situa-
tions have arisen in the past where Federal cleanup efforts
have been inadequate. Preemption of State funds would
make the States wholly dependent on the Federal funds and
response system. The result might be a decrease in the
degree of protection from oil spill damage, rather than an
increase.58
Under OPA, then, not only may states create their own liability
regimes, possibly providing for unlimited liability for oil spill costs
and damages, they may also establish independent oil pollution
compensation funds.59 Hence the liabilities to which a responsible
- See S. REP. No. 101-94, at 6 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 728.
" See id.
See id. at 7, 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 728.
5' Congress's decision not to preempt state action has had some unintended effects.
Following passage of OPA, a number of states have sought to impose added design and
safety requirements on vessel operating in state waters. This is in spite of the fact that in
crafting OPA's preemption clause, Congress appears to have intended that states be per-
mitted to supplement the liability provisions of federal law. The clause does not seem to
address the question of whether states may supplement federal vessel safety and con-
struction standards with legislation imposing greater requirements or restrictions on vessel
operation and manning. See H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-653, at 122 (1990), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 800-01.
Yet at least one court has recently held that OPA does not prevent a state from
imposing greater construction and safety standards on tankers than are provided in the
federal regulatory scheme. In International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
("Intertanko") v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996), a federal district court in
Washington State upheld Washington's "Best Achievable Protection Standards for Tankers"
(BAPS). See WASH. ADMiN. CODE § 317-21-020 (1995). The BAP standards were pro-
mulgated by Washington's Office of Marine Safety in an effort to implement the State's
tank vessel pollution prevention plan requirement. See WAH. REV. CODE ANN. §
88.46.040 (West 1992). The statute requires that all vessels operating in state waters have
approved pollution prevention plans, designed to provide "the best achievable protection"
from oil spills. See id. § 88.46.040(3). "Best achievable protection" is defined as "the
highest level of protection that can be achieved through the use of the best achievable
technology and those staffing levels, training procedures, and operational methods that
provide the greatest degree of protection available." Id. § 88.46.010(2).
The BAP standards impose a variety of other regulations on tanker operators as well.
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party is subject under OPA's federal liability rules may be supple-
mented by state legislation.
5. OPA as Compromise
The concessions made to pass OPA are evident in the tradeoffs
made between strict and unlimited liability and in the types of
defenses that can be asserted. Although a responsible party is
strictly liable, that liability is limited to a statutory amount. This
statutory limit was the result of an attempt to find the middle
ground between unlimited liability and the inadequate liability
limits of the FWPCA. Whether a vessel owner ought to be able to
limit liability at all is a question that animated much of the con-
gressional debates. Many in Congress and the environmental move-
ment sought to make vessel owners liable for all damages resulting
from oil spill incidents. OPA is designed to strike a balance be-
tween the need to obtain accountability from the industry and the
need to prevent a draconian liability regime from driving out re-
sponsible owners and operators.
The statute requires that certain equipment, such as a global positioning system and two
separate radar systems, be carried on board vessels. See WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 317-21-
265(1) (1995). It also requires that vessels be modified to permit towing from the bow
and stern. See id. § 317-21-256(2). The standards also require random, pre-employment
and post-incident drug testing. See id. § 317-21-235(2). Finally, it imposes Washington's
work hours and language requirements on all vessels. See id. §§ 317-21-245, 317-21-250.
Intertanko had argued that such regulations were invalid to the extent they exceeded
the requirements of federal statutes or international treaties to which the United States was
a signatory. See 947 F. Supp. at 1489-90. In upholding the standards, the district court
undertook a preemption analysis and determined that OPA evidenced an intent on the part
of Congress to permit states to supplement federal legislation designed to prevent oil
pollution. See id. at 1491. In so doing, however, the court seems to have overlooked the
very real difference between regulations governing liability and removal and those affect-
ing design, construction, and manning. The former, quite obviously, "are concerned with
all events which follow the unlawful discharge of oil," while the latter are intended to
prevent a casualty. Robert E. Falvey, A Shot Across the Bow: Rhode Island's Oil Pol-
lution Prevention and Control Act, 2 ROGER WMs. U. L. REv. 363, 384 (1997). The
court thus read OPA's preemption clause as permitting almost any type of state action so
long as it does not directly conflict with a federal statute or regulation. See Intertanko,
947 F. Supp. at 1491. This seems clearly contrary to the language of the clause which
permits state regulation imposing additional "liability or requirement with respect to the
discharge of oil.., or any removal activities in connection with such a discharge." 33
U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994) (emphasis added). Congress seems to have had a somewhat more
restrictive view of what was being preempted than did the district court in Intertanko.
Nonetheless, there are other commentators who tend to support the court's view. See, e.g.,
Laurie L. Crick, The Washington State BAP Standards: A Case Study in Aggressive Tank-
er Regulation, 27 . MAR. L. & COM. 641, 646 (1996) (arguing that the BAP standards
are constitutional).
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By strictly limiting the scope of defenses to liability, OPA
avoids many of the ambiguities that reduced the accountability of
polluters under the FWPCA. This is particularly so in its treatment
of third parties: OPA makes owners and operators pay the costs
resulting from the acts of irresponsible parties with whom they are
in privity. The statute thus creates incentives for vessel owners to
ensure that contractors and subcontractors are competent and reli-
able. OPA permits a third party defense only when a potentially
responsible party has taken precautions against foreseeable acts of
third parties, even when they are truly "strangers," thus offering
an incentive to operate with a high degree of vigilance and care.
The decision to leave states free to increase a discharger's
liability and require that the industry contribute to state funds has
been one of the most controversial aspects of OPA. By so doing,
Congress was seeking to maximize the state and federal resources
available for oil spill prevention and cleanup, but it is this choice
that poses the most serious constitutional difficulties for OPA.
If. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF OPA's GRANT OF
POWER TO THE STATES
OPA's non-preemption clause appears straightforward:
Section 2818. Relationship to Other Law
(a) Preservation of State Authorities...
Nothing in this Act or the Act of March 3, 1851 [The
Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act] shall-
(1) affect, or be construed or interpreted as preempt-
ing, the authority of any state or political subdivision
thereof from imposing any additional liability or re-
quirement with respect to-
(A) the discharge of oil or other pollution by oil
within such State; or
(B) any removal activities in connection with such a
discharge... 61
It is clear that Congress intended by this provision to grant the
states authority over marine oil pollution at least equal to the au-
thority given to the federal government in the other provisions of
OPA.62 The result has been to make those who discharge oil into
See 33 U.S.C. § 2703(a)(3)(B) (1994).
6 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994).
6z See Gregg L. MeCurdy, An Overview of OPA 1990 and its Relationship to Other
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waters of most states subject to more than one set of liability laws.
Where state legislation provides for strict and unlimited liability,
the limit on damages provided in OPA may be meaningless.63 For
instance, a 2,000 ton barge which discharges oil into state waters
would have its damages capped by OPA at $2.4 million," but in
a state with an unlimited liability statute its owners or operators
would nevertheless be responsible for all removal costs and damag-
es arising from an incident.'
Congress recognized that a number of local statutory regimes
might apply to spills, but it allowed this result, and even permitted
states to impose unlimited liability because of its concern that "a
polluter should pay in full for the costs of oil pollution caused by
that polluter;, and, a victim should be fully compensated."'  Yet,
in creating this situation, Congress undercut the value of the com-
promises it made in crafting the liability and limitation provisions
in OPA. Allowing states to impose additional liabilities on pollut-
ers, arguably on the grounds that such a regime would be benefi-
cial in making polluters fully accountable, seems inconsistent with
a federal regime that purportedly attempts to strike a balance be-
tween unlimited liability and liability without fault. This balance
was to be achieved by permitting shipowners to limit their liability
where there was no evidence of recklessness or gross negligence.67
Amounts above these limits were to be recovered from the OSLTF.
In this way, OPA was to spread the cost of most oil pollution
incidents among all potential users of oil. Unlimited liability was to
be reserved only for those whose conduct was grossly negligent or
reckless.
This finely crafted balance was disrupted by the inclusion of
the non-preemption clause, which permits states to ignore the limi-
tations granted shipowners by the other provisions of OPA. In
yielding to the states' demands' that OPA not preempt that which
Laws, 5 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 423, 440 (1993).
See 33 U.S.C. § 2704; see also supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
'" See 33 U.S.C. §§ 2704(a)(1)(B)(ii) (1994) (2000 GRT x $1,200 - $2.4 million).
6' See, e.g., Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation Act, R.L GEN. LAws §
46-12.3-1 to 46-12.3-8 (1996) (providing for strict, unlimited liability for all costs and
damages arising from an oil pollution incident, including natural resources damages, eco-
nomic damages, damage to real and personal property, and attorneys' fees).
S. REP. No. 101-94, at 7 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 728.
6" See 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994).
See Richard L. Jarashow, Survey of State Legislation, 5 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 447, 448
(1993) ("The lawmaking process in the United States has been weaned on the concept of
taking the path of least resistance. .. ").
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is arguably within the states' police power, 9 Congress negated
one of the purposes for which OPA had been proposed: replacing
the "fragmented collection of Federal and state laws providing
inadequate cleanup and damage remedies" '7 with a unified statuto-
ry regime.
OPA's non-preemption clause does not satisfy the constitutional
requirement of uniformity in the maritime law. That Congress has
the power to regulate maritime affairs is not in doubt: At least two
different constitutional provisions grant it this power. The Com-
merce Clause gives Congress the power "to regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian Tribes."7' The Article I grant of admiralty jurisdiction to
the federal courts is held to give the federal government "the para-
mount power to fix and determine the maritime law." Because
the commerce and admiralty powers are of different textual origin,
determining the constitutionality of a statute affecting maritime
commerce requires a consideration of the purposes and applicability
of the statute in light of these two constitutional provisions. The
problem, of course, is that it is often difficult to determine which
powers are implicated by a particular enactment. Where statutes
affecting admiralty matters are concerned, it is not often clear
whether Congress is acting pursuant to the Commerce Clause pow-
er alone or under the Admiralty Clause. Yet, such an analysis is
necessary because of the special place which admiralty occupies in
the constitutional scheme.
While the admiralty power might reasonably be considered a
subset of the power to regulate interstate commerce, the Framers
intended to treat admiralty differently from other commercial mat-
ters. The difficulties posed for interstate commerce by the lack of
central government control under the Articles of Confederation was
the primary motivation for the inclusion of the Commerce Clause
in the earliest drafts of the Constitution. The Framers felt the need
to prevent states from erecting barriers to commerce or from inter-
fering in the smooth conduct of foreign relations by adopting dif-
6. See Grumbles & Manley, supra note 18, at 38 ("The 'preemption approach' seems
to have given way to the 'pile it on' approach. This approach is likely to continue even
with the recent trend to restrict environmental liabilities and 'downsize' the federal gov-
ernment. Why? The states' rights argument has become too strong to challenge.").
' S. REP. No. 101-94, at 2 (1989), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 723.
U.S. CONsT. art. 1, § 8, ci. 3.
' See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917); see also U.S. CONST.
art. III, § 2.
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ferential tariffs for foreign goods. The reason for the incorporation
of the Commerce Clause into the Constitution was to ensure the
uniform treatment of commerce throughout the states.' Although
it, too, was designed to ensure uniformity of law among the states,
the admiralty power was also designed to ensure uniformity on an
international scale. The special grant of admiralty power was in-
tended to allow Congress to make the maritime law of the United
States conform to other maritime powers. Uniformity in maritime
law was seen as an aid not only to commercial development but to
international relations.74 Although the Commerce Clause was in-
tended to ensure undisrupted trade among the states, and between
the United States and the world, it has never been thought to re-
quire America's commercial laws be in harmony with those of
other countries. The Admiralty Clause, on the other hand, was
intended to accomplish just such a purpose.
Federal statutes affecting maritime affairs must be consistent
with the purposes of the Admiralty Clause, and not just those of
the Commerce Clause. Although Congress may permit states to
enact non-uniform legislation pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the
Admiralty Clause prohibits Congress from allowing states to enact
non-uniform rules applying to maritime commerce. This section
will show that OPA's non-preemption clause does not offend the
Commerce Clause because states have been traditionally thought to
have a residual power under the Commerce Clause to regulate
commerce within their borders. Such powers exist to allow states
to provide for the health and safety of the population.' Local
statutes imposing liability for discharges of oil in state waters may
be permissible under a Commerce Clause analysis simply because
Congress has chosen not to preempt them. This section will also
show that these same statutes may nevertheless be unconstitutional
when viewed in the light of the Admiralty Clause. Specifically, this
section will demonstrate that the uniformity envisioned by the
Framers in vesting Congress with admiralty power is inconsistent
with the delegation of that power to the states. Thus, an act such
as OPA which permits states to impose such non-uniform burdens
on maritime commerce will. be seen to be constitutionally defective.
7. See infra notes 76-80.
71 See infra text accompanying note 129.
' Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 203 (1824).
19971
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
A. OPA and the Commerce Clause
Commerce between the American colonies encountered few
legal barriers because the Crown provided a strong legal and ad-
ministrative framework for the management of trade. The naviga-
tion acts passed during the 17th and 18th centuries not only en-
sured that England remained the center of imperial trade, but also
provided uniform laws to govern the export and import of goods
between the colonies and the mother country.76 This system inevi-
tably broke down with the outbreak of revolution. Under the Arti-
cles of Confederation, "the conflicting economic interests of the
new states led to what may best be described as economic cha-
os." In fact, the Articles specifically prohibited Congress from
limiting state power over commerce or the taxation of imports or
exports." As a result, individual states erected trade barriers
against competing products from other states.79 The fractured legal
regime affecting interstate commerce convinced many that the
powers of the national government needed to be enhanced."
Surprisingly little debate attended the inclusion of the Com-
merce Clause in the Constitution. While there was some concern
that Congress might use the commerce power to favor the interests
of one region over another in international trade,8' there was gen-
7 See Matthew P. Harrington, The Legacy of the Colonial Vice-Admiralty Courts
(Part I), 26 J. MAR. L. & CoMM. 581, 591-595 (1995) (describing the English navigation
acts and the creation of the admiralty courts); see also LAWRENCE HARPER, THE ENGISH
NAVIGATION LAws, 375-378 (1939) (assessing the effect of the early English navigation
laws).
77. JOHN E. NOWAK Er AL., CONSTTmIONAL LAW, 144 (2d ed. 1983) (tracing the
course of events leading to the adoption of the Commerce Clause).
71- See UNITED STATES ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION, art. IX, § 1 (1777). ("[N]o
treaty of commerce shall be restrained from imposing such imposts and duties on foreign-
ers as their own people are subject to, or from Prohibiting the exportation or importation
of any species of goods or commodities. .. ").
79. See RICHARD B. MORRIS, THm FORGING OF THE UNION 1781-1789 149-52 (1987)
(discussing the impact of state-imposed tariffs).
' Id. at 151 ("It is hard to uncover any other issue in American history upon which
there was so much general agreement as there was on conferring upon Congress the su-
preme power over commerce.").
The South in particular was concerned that Congress would ban the importation of
slaves. See NOWAK, supra note 77, at 145. These fears were allayed by the inclusion of
a provision preventing Congress from enacting such a ban until 1808. See U.S. CONST.
art. I, § 9, cl. 1. Southern fears that a Congress dominated by Northern interests would
favor Northern trade at the expense of Southern agriculture were dispelled by the inclu-
sion of a provision stating that no preference would be given to the ports of any state
and that no export duties could be imposed. See U.S. CONST. art I, § 9, cl. 5, 6.
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eral agreement that the central government should have the para-
mount power to legislate in the area of interstate commerce.'2
Concerns that the commerce power was broad enough to swallow
up the states' police powers were answered by the assertion that
the commerce power was necessary to prevent trade barriers and
restrictions from hindering intercourse among the states and be-
tween them and other nations.
1. The Interstate Commerce Clause
The Supreme Court has always given great deference to
Congress's right to legislate pursuant to the Commerce Clause. In
Gibbons v. Ogden,"' the Court upheld the broadest possible scope
for the exercise of the interstate commerce power. Writing for the
majority, Chief Justice Marshall asserted that the Commerce Clause
power is "the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by
which commerce is to be governed. This power, like all others
vested in the Congress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to
its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations, other than are
prescribed in the Constitution."' Congressional power thus ex-
tends to "that commerce which concerns more states than one."'ss
Nonetheless, while Congress may not regulate the internal com-
merce of a state, the commerce power "cannot stop at the external
boundary-line of each State, but may be introduced into the interi-
or. v
87
See generally Morris, supra note 79.
"x See The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 398 (1913):
The conviction of [the Commerce Clause's] necessity sprang from the disastrous
experience under the Confederation when the States vied in discriminatory mea-
sures against each other. In order to end these evils, the grant in the Constitu-
tion conferred upon Congress an authority at all times adequate to secure the
freedom of interstate commercial intercourse from state control.
For more arguments of the necessity of the Commerce Clause, see THE FEDERALIST No.
11 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that a federal commerce power was necessary to allow
the United States to compete with the colonial powers) and THE FEDERALIST No. 45
(James Madison) (arguing that a federal commerce power was needed to counteract the
parochial tendencies of the states).
"t 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824). In this case, New York had granted a steamboat
monopoly to Livingston and Fulton, who in turn, assigned it to Ogden. Gibbons began
operating a steamboat in New York waters on the basis of a federal license. Ogden sued
to enjoin the continued operation of Gibbons' boat. Gibbons argued that the state monop-
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That the states retain some power to regulate commercial activ-
ity, even when such regulation affects interstate commerce, is not
in doubt. Although the Commerce Clause vests supreme authority
over interstate commerce in Congress, the Supreme Court has long
recognized the legitimacy of state action under their inherent police
powers. In a series of cases decided in the early part of the nine-
teenth century, the Supreme Court struggled to define exactly how
far the states might go. In Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh
Co.,88 the Court upheld a state law authorizing a private company
to erect a dam across an interstate waterway, even though the dam
obstructed interstate commerce. Writing again for the majority,
Chief Justice Marshall noted that the restriction on commerce
posed by the dam was non-discriminatory, affecting intrastate and
interstate commercial traffic equally. The Court also recognized the
right of the states to regulate commerce in the interest of local
heath and safety. In New York v. Miln,s9 the Supreme Court up-
held a New York statute requiring the master of every vessel dis-
charging passengers embarking from a port outside of New York
to file a report identifying the passengers. The statute was alleged
to protect the local populace against the arrival of undesirables. In
The Passenger Cases,' however, the Court struck down state leg-
islation imposing an arrival tax on passengers arriving from a for-
eign port.
The right of the states to regulate navigation was upheld in
Cooley v. Board of Wardens.9 This case involved a Pennsylvania
statute requiring vessels transiting the Delaware River to engage a
local pilot. The Supreme Court declared that "the power to regulate
commerce includes the regulation of navigation" and that "[tihe
power to regulate navigation is the power to prescribe rules in
conformity with which navigation must be carried on. It extends to
the persons who conduct it, as well as to the instruments used.' "3
That Congress possessed the power to control local pilotage
was never in doubt.94 The critical question was whether the
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
48 U.S. (7 How.) 28 (1849).
"* 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
91 Id.
9'. Id. at 316.
9' Id. ("If Congress has power to regulate the seamen who assist the pilot in the
management of the vessel, a power never denied, we can perceive no valid reason why
the pilot should be beyond the reach of the same power.").
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Constitution's grant of the commerce power to Congress deprived
the states of concurrent power over the same subject.95 The Court
answered in the negative and acknowledged a residual power in the
states to regulate interstate commerce, including the right to impose
regulations on navigation in state waters. Nonetheless, the Court
recognized that Congress possessed the paramount power to regu-
late navigation and commerce. The states, however, may exercise
power over commerce in the absence of preemptive federal regula-
tion:
The grant of commercial power to Congress does not con-
tain any terms which expressly exclude the States from
exercising an authority over its subject-matter.... [The
mere grant of such a power in Congress, did not imply a
prohibition on the States to exercise the same power, ...
it is not the mere existence of such a power, but its exer-
cise by Congress, which may be incompatible with the
exercise of the same power by the States, and.., the
States may legislate in the absence of congressional regula-
tions.96
The essence of Cooley is the recognition of a residual com-
merce power in the states and of the constitutionality of concurrent
state regulation of navigation in the absence of congressional ac-
tion. The Court affirmed Congress's prerogative to establish a
uniform, national rule where necessary, but it deferred to
Congress's determination that such a rule was not required where
local regulation of the subject matter would be more desirable.Y
Having established the primacy of Congress in the regulation
of interstate commerce in Cooley, the Court still had to determine
the limits of the acceptable use of concurrent state power. Cooley
ended any possible doubt that states have the power to enact legis-
lation that affects interstate commerce,9" but the precise limits of
their power depends on whether Congress has passed laws in the
area in which the states wish to regulate. Where Congress has
acted, the Supremacy Clause' will operate to make federal law
9 See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 318 (1851).
9 See id. at 318-19.
" See id. at 320-21.
See id. at 299.
' U.S. CONST. art VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
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override state law." ° Where no federal statute is in effect, the
"dormant" aspect of the Commerce Clause will determine the anal-
ysis.
Congress preempts any state regulation of interstate commerce
when in a statute it clearly manifests its intent to do so:' ' "It is
well-established that within Constitutional limits Congress may
preempt state authority by so stating in express terms.' ' " Absent
express preemption, Congress's intent to preempt state legislation
may also be found in "a scheme of federal regulation so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room to
supplement it.' '""l Even where Congress seems to have left room
for state action, local legislation is preempted to the extent it actu-
ally conflicts with a federal statute. This occurs when "compliance
with both federal and state regulation is a physical impossibili-
ty' " or where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.' ' °
Because the Commerce Clause has been held to contain an
"implicit or 'dormant' limitation on the authority of the States to
enact legislation affecting interstate commerce,"' "re state regula-
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
See Pennsylvania v. Nelson, 350 U.S. 497 (1956) (holding that the federal Smith
Act preempts the Pennsylvania Sedition Act); Rice v. Santa Fe Elev. Corp., 331 U.S. 218
(1947) (hblding that the Federal Warehouse Act was intended by Congress to preempt
state laws addressing the same issues); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) (holding
that, in light of the potential conflict between state and federal law, the Court must deter-
mine the validity of the Pennsylvania Alien Registration Act).
. See Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605, 611 (1926) (holding that
Congressional action may preclude state regulation of locomotive equipment used in inter-
state commerce).
02. Pacific Gas and Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Comm'n., 461
U.S. 190, 203 (1983) (holding that California regulations of nuclear power plant waste
disposal were not preempted by federal statute).
'0'- Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass'n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982)
(holding that a Federal Home Loan Board regulation barred the application of a conflict-
ing state rule).
"o' Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)
(holding that a California regulation did not impair federal authority, and consequently
was not preempted).
'05. Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
'" Healy v. Beer Inst., Inc., 491 U.S. 324, 326 n.1 (1989) (holding that a Connecticut
law that set price scales that affected other states was a violation of the Commerce
Clause).
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tions may still be found to violate the Commerce Clause even in
the absence of congressional action. State statutes may be declared
invalid if they impose an undue burden on interstate commerce or
are designed to favor local interests at the expense of other
states."°
OPA's liability provisions encounter no difficulty under the
interstate Commerce Clause; there is no statutory preemption prob-
lem because Congress has specifically expressed its intent not to
preempt state legislation."°s Similarly, a dormant Commerce
Clause analysis is made redundant by an explicit grant of power by
Congress to the states."° States are, therefore, free under the
Commerce Clause to impose greater liability for discharges in state
waters.
The only question remaining is whether a particular state stat-
ute conflicts with OPA's other provisions. This may occur if states
impose construction or design requirements different from those
provided for in OPA. Thus, a state statute requiring double hulls
on barges or tankers before the year 201510 (the year such de-
signs are required by OPA)... might be invalid because it directly
". See City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978) (invalidating on
Commerce Clause grounds a New Jersey law that prohibited the importation of out-of-
state waste). The "dormant" Commerce Clause was first used by the Supreme Court to
strike down state legislation in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S.
(13 How.) 518 (1852), in which it held that a Virginia statute authorizing the construction
of a bridge over the Ohio River which obstructed traffic was unconstitutional. The Court
had previously flirted with the concept in both Gibbons v. Ogden, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.)
316 (1819), and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829).
zr See 33 U.S.C. § 2718 (1994).
109. See Western and Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S.
648, 652-53 (1981):
Congress may "confe[r] upon the States an ability to restrict the flow of inter-
state commerce that they would not otherwise enjoy." If Congress ordains that
- the States may freely regulate an aspect of interstate commerce, any action
taken by a State within the scope of the congressional authorization is rendered
invulnerable to the Commerce Clause challenge.
(citations omitted).
"' See Rhode Island Oil Spill Pollution Prevention and Control Act, R.I. GEN. LAws
§ 46-12.5-24(a) (1996) (requiring that, effective June 1, 1997, any vessel transiting Rhode
Island waters with oil in bulk in limited visibility have either a double hull or tug es-
cort). A single-hulled tanker transiting these waters in 2002, would be in violation of the
Rhode Island statute while still in compliance with OPA. See id. § 46-12.524(b); see also
Flavey, supra note 59 (giving a full discussion of the Rhode Island OSPPCA).
"' See 46 U.S.C. § 3703(a) (1994). OPA actually provides for a phase-in requirement.
See id. Double hulls are required at different times depending on vessel size and age. See
id.
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conflicts with federal law."2
2. The Foreign Commerce Clause
The states' power over foreign commerce is substantially more
limited than their power over intrastate commerce. In DiSanto v.
Pennsylvania,"' the Supreme Court struck down a Pennsylvania
statute requiring steamboat ticket sellers to obtain a license from
the state. Pennsylvania argued that the regulation was a valid exer-
cise of its police powers, designed to protect the public from fraud,
but the Court struck down the statute as unwarranted burden on
foreign commerce. In so doing, the Supreme Court seemed to
adopt a different standard for state regulation affecting foreign
commerce. In the Court's view, foreign commerce required uniform
treatment, and any state regulation would necessarily result in
variable burdens being created. A national approach to foreign
commerce is necessary to preserve a national foreign policy. Half a
century later, the Court was to expand on this theory, holding that
"[i]n international relations and with respect to foreign intercourse
and trade the people of the United States act through a single
government with unified and adequate national power.""' 4
The aim of the Commerce Clause is "to prevent discrimination
and the erection of barriers or obstacles to the free flow of com-
merce, interstate or foreign.""' 5 The preemption analysis applica-
ble to state regulation under the Foreign Commerce Clause is al-
most identical to that applicable to the Interstate Commerce Sub-
Clause."6 The need for a single national foreign policy is the ex-
"' See, e.g., Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978) (invalidating that part
of then-existing Washington state law requiring more stringent construction and design
standards than those provided for in federal law); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-653
(1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 722, 800 (discussing OPA's non-preemption clause
and stating that OPA is not intended to "disturb the.Supreme Court's decision in Ray v.
Atlantic Richfield Company). But see International Association of Independent Tanker
Owners v. Lowry, 947 F. Supp. 1484 (W.D. Wash. 1996) (upholding Washington State's
BAP standards); Michael P. Mullahy, Note, States' Rights and the Oil Pollution Act of
1990: A Sea of Confusion?, 25 HOFTRA L. REv. 607 (1996) (arguing that Washington
State BAP standards are not preempted by the OPA).
3. 273 U.S. 34 (1927).
" Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979) (invalidating
a California tax law that caused multiple taxation of foreign commerce on the grounds
that it interfered with the Congressional power to regulate foreign commerce).
11. DiSanto, 273 U.S. at 43 (Stone, J., dissenting).
16 Some commentators have actually urged the end of a separate analysis under the
foreign commerce power. See Peter J. Spiro, The State and Immigration in an Era of
Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 167 (1994) (examining the prospect of
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tra ingredient added to foreign commerce power analysis. Nonethe-
less, the fact that Congress has permitted states to supplement
OPA's liability provisions would probably preclude any argument
that OPA violates the Foreign Commerce Clause.
Absent any explicit preemption, '1 7 state power might reach
the regulation of oil pollution in state waters without violating the
Commerce Clause. Cooley v. Board of Wardens"' certainly stands
for the proposition that the Commerce Clause, at least in its dor-
mant aspect, does not invalidate all state regulation of commerce.
This is particularly true where the subject matter of the regulation
is essentially one of local concern. The regulation of pilotage, one
such local concern, was thought to be an appropriate subject for
state regulation until such time as Congress chose to preempt local
legislation. As a result, in the absence of any express congressional
preemption, states retain power under the Commerce Clause to
regulate oil pollution consistent with the principles announced in
Cooley.
OPA specifically authorizes state action, however."9 There is,
then, no real argument that traditional statutory preemption analysis
would result in the invalidation of state liability statutes.'"
Congress's explicit choice not to preempt makes a statutory pre-
emption analysis unnecessary because there simply can be no con-
flict between any permitted state regulation and the federal statute.
The only remaining argument is that Congress lacks power
under the Commerce Clause to allow states to enact non-uniform
pollution statutes. Yet while the Constitution has explicitly granted
power to Congress to legislate in the area of interstate and foreign
commerce, that power is not exclusive."' Congress may authorize
state action that might otherwise violate the dormant Commerce
Clause, even when such legislation has previously been struck
down by the' Supreme Court.'" The deference given Congress's
heightened state involvement in immigration control); see also Itel Containers Int'l Corp.
v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgement) ("[No state can ever actually 'prevent this Nation from speaking with one
voice.'") (quoting Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 451).
"7. See Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Cons. & Dev. Comm'n,
461 U.S. 190, 203-08 (1983) (discussing Congressional power to preempt state action un-
der the Commerce Clause).
"g 53 U.S. (19 How.) 299 (1851); see also supra text accompanying notes 91-98.
"' See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994).
'" See Pacific Gas & Elec., 461 U.S. at 204; see also supra text accompanying notes
101-05.
2. See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
In the Wheeling River Bridge Cases, the Supreme Court first struck down a Vir-
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decisions by the Supreme Court substantially negates the argument
that Congress cannot delegate its commerce power to the states."
Under this analysis, OPA's failure to preempt supplementary
state action is not violative of the Commerce Clause.
B. OPA and the Admiralty Clause
1. Uniformity and the Admiralty Clause
The text of the Constitution does not explicitly grant power to
Congress to regulate maritime affairs. Instead, federal power over
admiralty is derived from the Article III grant of admiralty jurisdic-
tion to the federal courts."2 This grant, in conjunction with the
power vested in Congress "[t]o make all. laws which may be neces-
sary and proper" for carrying into execution the powers enumerated
under the Constitution, has been held to give Congress power to
create and modify the substantive admiralty law:
[I]t must now be accepted as settled doctrine that in conse-
quence of these provisions Congress has paramount power
to fix and determine the maritime law which shall prevail
throughout the country. And further, that in the absence of
some controlling statute the general maritime law as accept-
ed by the federal courts constitutes part of our national law
applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction."a
ginia statute authorizing the construction of a bridge over the Ohio River. See Pennsylva-
nia v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1851). Congress then
passed a statute authorizing the bridge construction. The Court then held that Congress
could retroactively validate otherwise invalid state regulation. See Pennsylvania v. Wheel-
ing & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421 (1856).
'2. In Leisey v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890), the Supreme Court struck down an
Iowa law banning the importation of intoxicating liquors. Congress countered by enacting
a statute that made the importation of alcoholic beverages subject to local control, and the
Supreme Court upheld that statute, rejecting the argument that Congress could not delegate
its commerce power. See In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891); see also Northeast Bancorp
v. Board of Governors, 472 U.S. 159, 175 (1985) ("When Congress so chooses, State
actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Com-
merce Clause."); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408 (1946) (reaffirming that
state regulation otherwise invalid under a dormant Commerce Clause analysis may be
legitimized by affirmative Congressional action).
"2 U.S. CONST. art. M, § 2 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution .. . and to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction ... ").
". Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917) (citations omitted).
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That Congress has the power to "fix and determine" the sub-
stantive maritime law is not itself a revolutionary idea. Such a
power is consistent with the view of the Framers that the maritime
law should be uniform throughout the nation. It was obvious to
them that Congress should exercise primary responsibility for en-
suring uniformity of the law. The Framers believed uniformity
served two purposes: aiding in the development of interstate and
international commerce and preventing the new nation from becom-
ing embroiled in maritime disputes with other nations. According
to the Supreme Court:
Comity with other nations and among the States was a
primary aim of the Constitution. At the time of the fram-
ing, it was essential that our own prospective foreign trad-
ing partners know the United States would uphold its trea-
ties, respect the general maritime law and refrain from
erecting barriers to commerce. The individual States needed
similar assurances from each other.
126
As one commentator has noted, "the founders understood the im-
portance of commerce to the new nation, and they understandably
chose to delimit an area of law that would provide uniformity with
those of our trading partners."127
The admiralty power is akin to the commerce power, at least
in so far as there is an emphasis on uniformity. The admiralty
power differs from the commerce power in that Congress is not
free to delegate its authority over maritime affairs to the states:
such a delegation would completely disrupt the uniformity of the
substantive maritime law in its international and interstate aspects.
Uniformity in maritime matters is, thus, a constitutional imperative:
The maritime law was viewed by the Framers as a single body of
law applicable throughout the nation, and indeed the world, with a
minimum of variation. The Admiralty Clause operates as a sub-
stantive limitation on the power of Congress to impair the unifor-
mity of the maritime law. The Admiralty Clause also grants federal
courts the power to enforce uniformity in the face of attempts by
the legislatures to corrupt it.
American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 466 (1994).
'" Steven R. Swanson, Federalism, the Admiralty, and Oil Spills, 27 J. MAR. L. &
COM. 379, 381 (1996) (evaluating "how best to deal with the legal ramifications of oil
spills" under admiralty law).
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The evidence that the Admiralty Clause creates a substantive
requirement for uniformity is found in the fact that admiralty con-
stituted a distinct body of law at the formation of the Union. This
body of law was implicitly adopted by the Framers as the substan-
tive law of the United States:
That we have a maritime law of our own, operative
throughout the United States cannot be doubted. The gener-
al system of maritime law which was familiar to the law-
yers and statesmen of the country when the Constitution
was adopted, was most certainly intended and referred to
when it -was declared in that instrument that the judicial
power of the United States shall extend "to all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." . . . One thing, how-
ever, is unquestionable; the Constitution must have referred
to a system of law coextensive with, and operating uni-
formly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have
been intended to place the rules and limits of maritime law
under the disposal and regulation of the several States, as
that would have defeated the uniformity and consistency at
which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of a commer-
cial character affecting the intercourse of the States with
each other or with foreign states."~
The international character of maritime law makes uniformity
all the more necessary:
It is obvious that this class of [civil admiralty] cases has,
or may have, an intimate relation to the rights and duties
of foreigners in navigation and maritime commerce. It may
materially affect our intercourse with foreign states; and
raise many questions of international law, not merely
touching private claims, but national sovereignty, and na-
tional reciprocity. ...
[W]e see, that the admiralty jurisdiction naturally con-
nects itself, on the one hand, with our diplomatic relations
and duties to foreign nations, and their subjects; and, on
the other hand, with the great interests of navigation and
commerce, foreign and domestic. There is, then, a peculiar
wisdom in giving to the national government a jurisdiction
of this sort, which cannot be wielded, except for the gener-
nThe Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874).
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al good; and which multiplies the securities for the public
peace abroad, and gives commerce and navigation the most
encouraging support at home. 9
Although Congress has the paramount power to determine the
substantive maritime law, states nevertheless retain a residual power
derived from their police powers"'e to enact local regulations that
may affect navigation. And, while the Supreme Court has upheld
state regulations that marginally impact maritime commerce, it has
never explicitly held that the states possess any power at all to
enact or alter substantive admiralty law. That power is reserved for
Congress alone. State legislation regulating maritime affairs is,
therefore, best viewed as an exertion of the states' police power
and applicable only by the virtue of the Commerce Clause. Thus,
the pilotage regulations upheld in Cooley v. Board of Wardens are
more properly considered legislation applicable and valid under the
commerce power only because Congress had not chosen to preempt
them.' At no time did the Court entertain the suggestion that
the states had any admiralty power at all.' A state law might
thus be both a valid exercise of the state's police powers under
Commerce Clause and unconstitutional as a violation of the Admi-
ralty Clause.
Lacking any inherent admiralty power, states may only affect
navigation and maritime commerce through the exercise of that
authority which is inherent in their police power and which is
neither prohibited by the dormant Commerce Clause nor preempted
'29' JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§
1664, 1666 (1833); see also United States v. The William, 28 F. Cas. 614, 621 (D.
Mass. 1808) (No. 16,700) ("The navigation system has long stood prominent. The interests
of commerce are often made subservient to those of shipping and navigation. Maritime
and naval strength is the great object of national solicitude; the grand and ultimate objects
are the defense and security of the country.").
2 Chief Justice Marshall described the inherent police power as:
mhat immense mass of legislation, which embraces every thing within the
territory of a State, not surrendered to the general government: all which can
be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves. Inspection laws,
quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating
the internal commerce of a State, and those which respect turnpike roads, fer-
ries, &c., are component parts of this mass.
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203 (1824).
"' See Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851) (holding that the
granting of the commerce power to Congress does not, by itself, prevent the states from
passing pilotage laws).
"L See id. at 318-21.
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by federal action. Thus, although Congress might suffer the states
to enact non-uniform commercial legislation under the Commerce
Clause,'33 the admiralty power does not permit the same freedom.
On the contrary, the Admiralty Clause envisions a generally uni-
form system of maritime law that cannot be corrupted by inconsis-
tent state legislation.' This body of law is composed of both
judge-made rules of law as well as the statutes of the United
States.1
35
2. How Far Can the States Go?
a. Jensen and Preemption
The Supreme Court has traditionally prevented the states from
enacting legislation that disturbs the essential harmony of the mari-
time law, holding that the Constitution's admiralty grant was adopt-
ed to ensure the nation would have a uniform set of maritime
laws. At the same time, however, the Supreme Court has recog-
nized the states have a strong interest in regulating activities within
their borders. The task throughout the years has been to determine
exactly how far state power extends before it will be found to
' See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421
(1856).
" See Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917) ("And plainly, we
think, no such [state] legislation is valid if it contravenes the essential purpose expressed
by an act of Congress or works material prejudice to the characteristic features of the
general maritime law....").
"33. See id.; see also Thompson v. The Catharina, 23 F. Cas. 1028, 130-31 (D. Pa.
1795) (No. 13,949). The court in Thompson stated:
But the change in the form of our government has not abrogated all the laws,
customs and principles of our jurisprudence, we inherited from our ancestors;
and possessed at the period of our becoming an independent nation. The people
of these states, both individually and collectively, have the common law, in all
cases, consistent with the change of our government, and the principles on
which it is founded. They possess, in like manner, the maritime law, which is
part of the common law, existing at the same period; and this is peculiarly
within the cognizance of courts, invested with maritime jurisdiction; although it
is referred to, in all our courts on maritime questions. It is, then, not to be
disputed, on sound principles, that this court must be governed in its decisions,
by the Maritime Code we possessed at the period before stated- as well as by
the particular laws since established by our own government, or which may
hereafter be enacted. These laws and the decisions under them, must be re-
ceived as authorities, in this and other courts of our country "in all cases of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction," to which, by the constitution, it is declared
"the judicial power of the United States shall extend."
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disrupt the essential harmony of the maritime law. In Southern
Pacific Co. v. Jensen, the Supreme Court adopted a view of Admi-
ralty Clause that made it something akin to the Supremacy
Clause,"s holding state legislation cannot be valid if it "contra-
venes the essential purpose of an Act of Congress or works materi-
al prejudice to the characteristic features of the general maritime
law or interferes with the proper harmony of that law in its inter-
national or interstate relations."'37 In the Court's view, Congress's
power to legislate in the area of maritime law was similar to that
granted to it in the Commerce Clause: Congress might modify the
general maritime law, but states may not act to regulate maritime
matters if such regulation would adversely affect an exercise of
federal power."8 The so-called "Jensen doctrine" effectively pro-
vided for federal supremacy over admiralty matters, prohibiting the
states from acting to contravene a federal maritime law. Difficulties
in applying the Jensen doctrine have proved to be a source- of a
great deal of confusion and uncertainty over the years, and the
decision itself has been the subject of repeated criticism.'39 None-
'x U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
" Southern Pae. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 216 (1917). Jensen involved a Con-
stitutional challenge to the applicability of New York State's workers' compensation law
to longshore workers. L at 213. The employer succeeded by arguing that the statute
would interfere with the harmony of the maritime law. See id. at 216.
'" The Jensen Court stated-
A similar rule in respect to interstate commerce deduced from the grant to
Congress of power to regulate it is now firmly established. "Where the subject
is national in its character, and admits and requires uniformity of regulation, af-
fecting alike all the States, such as transportation between the States .. Con-
gress can alone act upon it and provide the needed regulations."
Id. (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 507-08 (1888)).
" . See, e.g., American Dredging Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 452 (1994) ("It would
be idle to pretend that the line separating permissible from impermissible state regulation
is readily discernable in our admiralty jurisprudence...."); Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor
Corp. U.S.A., 40 F.3d 622, 628 (3rd Cir. 1994) ("Mhe Jensen language is little more
than a convenient slogan, providing little guidance."), affd, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996); see
also GILMORE & BLACK, supra note 14, at 642 (claiming that Jensen is tied with The
General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 438 (1819), which established the home port lien doc-
trine, as the "most ill-advised admiralty decision ever handed down by the Supreme
Court").
Jensen's uniformity principle is probably easier to state that to apply in concrete
situations. Courts usually attempt to balance the interests of both state and federal inter-
ests where the question is whether state law should apply. In many cases the interests am
not at all clear. The Eleventh Circuit summed up some of the difficulties thus:
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theless, the principle of uniformity retains "vitality."'"
OPA's preemption clause is not a Jensen problem, however, as
state legislation regulating oil pollution in this situation is not
enacted contrary to an express purpose of Congress. Indeed, it can
be fairly argued that Congress invited state action. The real ques-
tion is whether Congress may delegate to the states the power to
supplement the federal oil pollution regime, even when state legis-
lation affects maritime interests.
b. Knickerbocker and the Non-Delegation Principle
The question of whether delegation is permissible would seem
to have been answered by the Supreme Court's decision in
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart,4' wherein it held Congress
could not constitutionally delegate its admiralty power.
[Congress's] power to legislate concerning rights and liabil-
ities within the maritime jurisdiction and remedies for their
enforcement, arises from the Constitution.... The definite
object of the grant was to commit direct control to the
Federal Government; to relieve maritime commerce from
unnecessary burdens and disadvantages incident to discor-
dant legislation; and to establish, so far as practicable,
harmonious and uniform rules applicable throughout every
part of the Union."
One must identify the state law involved and determine whether there is an
admiralty principle with which the state law conflicts, and, if there is no such
admiralty principle, consideration must be given to whether such an admiralty
rule should be fashioned. If none is to be fashioned, the state rule should be
followed. If there is an admiralty-state law conflict, the comparative interests
must be considered---they may be such that admiralty shall prevail or if the
policy underlying the admiralty rule is not strong and the effect on admiralty is
minimal, the state law may be given effect. ...
Steelmet, Inc. v. Caribe Towing Corp., 779 F.2d 1485, 1488 (11th Cir. 1986) (citations
omitted).
There are thus very few standards for courts to use when determining where a par-
ticular state law is preempted by an admiralty rule. This lack of standards has resulted in
a series of conflicting approaches to the problem of uniformity. See Robert D. Peltz, The
Myth of Uniformity in Maritime Law, 21 TtL. MAR. LJ. 103 (1996) (discussing conflicts
in approaches to the uniformity problem).
"* See Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325, 344 (1973).
141 253 U.S. 149 (1920). In response to Jensen, Congress amended the savings clause
of the Judiciary Act to permit the application of state workers' compensation laws. Id. at
163.
" Id. at 164; see also Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., 254 U.S. 219 (1924).
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The non-delegation principle of Knickerbocker is thus properly
thought to be a consequence of the requirement of uniformity.
Preventing Congress from delegating its power to legislate in admi-
ralty matters ensures "the proper harmony of that law in its inter-
national or interstate relations" is maintained.
The foundation of the uniformity principle is that the body of
admiralty law existing at the time of the ratification of the Consti-
tution was incorporated wholesale into the law of the United
States:
As there could be no cases of "admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction," in the absence of some maritime law under
which they could arise, the [Admiralty Clause] presupposes
the existence in the United States of a law of that charac-
ter. Such a law or system of law existed in colonial times
and during the Confederation, and commonly was applied
in the adjudication of admiralty and maritime cases. It
embodied the principles of the general maritime law, some-
times called the law of the sea, with modifications and
supplements adjusting it to conditions and needs on this
side of the Atlantic. The framers of the Constitution were
familiar with that system and proceeded with it in mind.
Their purpose was not to strike down or abrogate the sys-
tem, but to place the entire subject-its substantive as well
as its procedural features-under national control, because
of its intimate relation to navigation and to interstate and
foreign commerce. In pursuance of that purpose the consti-
tutional provision was framed and adopted. Although con-
taining no express grant of legislative power over the sub-,
stantive law, the provision was regarded from the beginning
as implicitly investing such power in the United States.
Commentators took that view. Congress acted on it, and
the courts, including this court, gave effect to it. Practically
therefore the situation is as if that view were written into
the provision. After the Constitution went into effect, the
substantive law theretofore in force was not regarded as
superseded or as being only the law of the several states,
but as having become the law of the United States-subject
to power in Congress to alter, qualify, or supplement it as
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experience or changing conditions might require. 43
Nonetheless, while the power of Congress "extends to the
entire subject,""' Congress is not completely free to alter the
general maritime law. Congress cannot exclude a traditional mari-
time subject from the admiralty, nor can it include a non-maritime
subject within its scope. 4s Most important, Congress is bound to
preserve the uniformity of the maritime law except where the sub-
ject to be regulated is of purely local concern: "[Tihe spirit and
purpose of the constitutional provision require that [congressional]
enactments-when not relating to matters whose existence or influ-
ence is confined to a more restricted field, as in Cooley v. Board
of Wardens, . . . -shall be coextensive with and operating uni-
formly in the whole of the United States."'"
Congress, then, may permit local regulation, but only when the
subject matter is exclusively local and will not have a substantial
impact on maritime commerce in general or otherwise affect sub-
stantive maritime rights and obligations. The pilotage regulations
upheld in Cooley are an example of a regulation that meets these
criteria. Whether a vessel takes on a pilot entering or exiting the
Port of Philadelphia is of concern to the Commonwealth of Penn-
sylvania, but of very little concern to others. To the extent such
regulations impose minimal burdens of compliance, as perhaps in
some modest fee for the service, they should be upheld. Were the
same regulations to alter the liabilities of vessel owners for damage
caused by the negligence of a pilot,47 they might rightfully be
held invalid. Such a regulation would not only affect interests far
beyond the purely local, it would also impose substantial burdens
on maritime commerce and destroy uniformity.
The Supreme Court has said elsewhere that "[e]venhanded local
regulation to effectuate a legitimate local public interest is valid
unless preempted by federal action . . . or unduly burdensome on
Panama R.R. Co. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375, 385-86 (1924).
I" d. at 386.
145. Id.
I' d. at 386-87 (citation omitted).
" A compulsory pilot is liable for his own negligence for damage to the vessel and
third parties. See Burgess v. MV Tamano, 564 F.2d 964 (1st Cir. 1977). Where damage
results to third parties, the vessel owner is not liable in personam for the neglect of a
compulsory pilot, although the vessel is liable in rem. See Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co.
v. La Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406 (1901); The China, 74 U.S. (7
Wall.) 53 (1869). A vessel owner is liable in personam, however, for the negligence of a
pilot where the pilotage is voluntary. See Homer Ramsdell, 182 U.S. at 415-16.
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maritime activities," and that a state "may not impose a burden
which materially affects interstate commerce in an area where
uniformity of regulation is necessary."' 4 The primary question in
this regard is whether the subject matter at issue requires uniformi-
ty of regulation. In discussing the Commerce Clause, the Supreme
Court has held local regulations are invalid where uniformity is
required to effect the purposes of the constitutional grant:
The grant in the Constitution of its own force, that is,
without action by Congress, established the essential immu-
nity of interstate commercial intercourse from the direct
control of the states with respect to those subjects em-
braced within the grant which are of such a nature as to
demand that, if regulated at all, their regulation should be
prescribed by a single authority. It has repeatedly been
declared by this court that as to those subjects which re-
quire a general system or uniformity of regulation, the
power of Congress is exclusive. In other matters, admitting
of diversity of treatment according to the special require-
ments of local conditions, the states may act within their
respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act; and,
when Congress does act, the exercise of its authority over-
rides all conflicting state legislation. 49
The international character of maritime affairs makes .the need
for uniformity more acute in admiralty than is otherwise required
in the context of interstate commerce."e Nonetheless, where the
subject at issue is of purely local concern, state regulation may still
be appropriate:
"' Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440, 443-44 (1960) (cita-
tions omitted) (upholding a smoke abatement ordinance as applied to passing ships).
M. The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 399, 400 (1913) (emphasis added).
"0' See JONATHAN EuOT, 3 DEBATEs IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 571 (1888) ("As our national tranquility and
reputation; and intercourse with foreign nations, may be affected by admiralty decisions;
as they ought, therefore, to be uniform; and as there can be no uniformity if there be
thirteen distinct, independent jurisdictions,-this jurisdiction ought to be in the federal
judiciary.") (quoting Edmund Randolph, Va.); see also id. at 532:
As our intercourse with foreign nations will be affected by [admiralty] deci-
sions ... they ought to be uniform. This can only be done by giving the
federal judiciary exclusive jurisdiction. Controversies affecting the interest of the
United States ought to be determined by their own judiciary, and not be left to
partial, local tribunals.
(quoting James Madison, Va.).
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Where necessarily remains to the states until Congress
acts, a wide range for the permissible exercise of power
appropriate to their territorial jurisdiction though interstate
commerce may be affected. It extends to those matters of a
local nature as to which it is impossible to derive from the
constitutional grant an intention that they should go uncon-
trolled pending Federal intervention. Thus, there are certain
subjects having the most obvious and direct relation to
interstate commerce, which nevertheless, with the acquies-
cence of Congress, have been controlled by state legislation
from the foundation of the government because of the
necessity that they should not remain unregulated, and that
their regulation should be adapted to varying local exigen-
cies .... ,
Congress may, therefore, refrain from enacting a uniform system of
regulation so as to permit local rules to govern. This is certainly
true under the commerce power, but where maritime commerce is
concerned, Congress's power to permit local regulation is more
restricted.
Admittedly, the difficulty lies in determining the difference
between a "legitimate local public interest" and a "material burden"
on maritime commerce. While it is hard to state any exact rule, the
general outlines seem clear. Congress may permit local regulation
of maritime affairs as long as these local regulations affect purely
local interests, are primarily directed to promoting health or safety,
and do not impose substantial burdens on commerce or alter sub-
stantive maritime rights and remedies. To the extent that state
legislation results in non-uniform obligations or subjects maritime
commerce to significant non-uniform burdens, it must be invalid.
The Supreme Court. has held that in determining whether a
regulation places an unreasonable "burden on commerce," courts
may consider whether the regulation imposes added costs of opera-
tion to comply, whether the regulation is discriminatory in its
effects, and whether the added costs are excessive relative to the
benefits ultimately obtained.'52 The Court's analysis in the context
The Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. at 401.
152 See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775-76 (1945):
The decisive question is whether in the circumstances the total effect of the
law as a safety measure in reducing accidents and casualties is so slight or
problematical as not to outweigh the national interest in keeping interstate corn-
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of the Commerce Clause is helpful in this regard:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state
statutes affecting interstate commerce have been variously
stated, the general rule that emerges can be phrased as
follows: Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effec-
tuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld
unless the burden imposed on such commerce is clearly
excessive in relation to the putative local benefits. If a
legitimate local purpose is found, then the question be-
comes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that
will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promot-
ed as well with a lesser impact on interstate activities."5 3
Whether a non-discriminatory regulation is unduly burdensome
requires a determination of the added costs necessary to comply
with the regulation relative to the "putative local benefits" ob-
tained.' In the maritime context, this means the costs imposed
on shipowners attempting to comply with local regulations must
not be excessive in comparison to the additional safety or security
1.iat results. Reasonable local regulations governing pilotage,"5
wharfage,156 tolls, and improvements to harbors and rivers" are
"va.d, as are health regulations, such as quarantine restrictions"
merce free from interferences which seriously impede it and subject it to local
regulation which does not have a uniform effect on the interstate [commerce] it
interrupts.
" Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citations omitted) (holding
that an Arizona rule that prohibited export of uncrated cantaloupes was an unwarranted
interference with interstate commerce); see also Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359
U.S. 520, 525, 527-30 (1959) (invalidating a state statute requiring a different mud guard
on trucks than were permitted in forty-five other states).
' See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
' See Anderson v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187 (1912) (holding that Ameri-
can vessels sailing from California with stops at foreign ports are subject to California
pilotage law); Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851).
'56. See Ouachita River Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887) (upholding a New
Orleans wharfage fee ordinance); Parkersburg v. Transportation Co, 107 U.S. 691 (1882)
(upholding a municipal wharfage fee ordinance).
""' See Cummings v. Chicago, 188 U.S. 410 (1903) (requiring joint assent of state and
federal government to allow a private party to build a dock on a river); Gilman v. Phila-
delphia, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1865) (permitting Pennsylvania to go forward with bridg-
ing a river); Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (allow-
ing construction of a dam in Delaware that interfered with navigation to go forward).
'- See Compagnie Francaise de Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 186
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or health inspections." 9 But where a state imposes regulations
that are unreasonable in scope, or that intrude upon a uniform
scheme, the regulations will be invalid. This would be the case if a
state attempted to impose stringent design or construction standards
on vessels entering its ports. Such regulations certainly will be
struck down if they actually conflict with federal statute," ° but
they may be invalid even in the absence of federal regulation if
they go beyond what is "plainly essential to safety and seaworthi-
ness."
161
A non-discriminatory regulation is also invalid when it results
in the derogation of substantive maritime rights or remedies. While
admiralty courts have traditionally enforced state-created reme-
dies," states have not been free to supplant maritime law and
substitute remedies created by statute or common law. The continu-
ing controversy over the applicability of state wrongful death reme-
dies to maritime tort is an example of this limit on state power.
Where interstate and international commerce is concerned, the
Supreme Court has decreed that uniformity is required, and has
created a wrongful death remedy in admiralty for those in maritime
employment." In the case of a non-seaman injured in state wa-
ters, the Court has allowed state law to provide a remedy for
wrongful death."6 Where admiralty does provide the remedy,
however, it is worth bearing in mind that states cannot grant a
U.S. 380 (1902); Railroad Co. v. Husen, 95 U.S. 465 (1877) (holding that state sanitary
laws that interfere with transportation are permissible only when they are unavoidably
necessary).
". See Asbell v. Kansas, 209 U.S. 251 (1908) (upholding a Kansas law requiring that
all cattle transported through the state be declared healthy by state or federal officials);
Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 138 (1902) (upholding a statute prohibiting the introduction of
diseased cattle into the state); Morgan's S.S. Co. v. Louisiana Bd. of Health, 118 U.S.
455 (1886) (upholding a state imposed fee for the sanitary inspection of vessels).
0 See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 158 (1978) (invalidating Wash-
ington State's then-existing tanker law).
"' Kelly v. Washington ex rel. Foss Co., 302 U.S. 1, 15 (1937) (upholding a Wash-
ington State vessel inspection law).
" State-created liens are enforced in admiralty courts. See The J.E. Rumbell, 13 S.
Ct. 498 (1893) (superseded by statute) (giving precedence to a state lien on a vessel in
its home port over a prior mortgage recorded under federal statute); Ex parte Hagar, 104
U.S. 520 (1881) (permitting federal admiralty jurisdiction over a case arising under a Del-
aware pilotage law); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874) (upholding fed-
eral enforcement of a Louisiana state law lien in favor of materialmen).
' See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1972) (superseded by
statute).
"6 See Yamaha Motor Corp., U.S.A. v. Calhoun, 116 S. Ct. 619 (1996) (holding that
state law determines the damages available for the death of a jet skier).
[Vol. 48:1
OPA'S DELEGATION OF POWER TO STATES
plaintiff a means to opt out of the federal scheme. Thus, where
seamen are concerned, states may not impose a liability other than
that prescribed by the maritime law upon a vessel owner. As the
Supreme Court has noted:
[N]o State has the power to abolish the well recognized
maritime rule of the measure of recovery and substitute
therefor it the full indemnity rule of the common law. Such
a substitution would distinctly change the settled maritime
law; and would be destructive of the "uniformity and con-
sistency at which the Constitution aimed on all subjects of
a commercial character affecting the intercourse of the
States with each other and foreign states."'
'1
While Congress may make substantial alterations in the mari-
time law, it may not permit the states to do so. The need for uni-
formity in admiralty has traditionally been the paramount concern
in fashioning maritime law. Permitting states to impose different
regulations or burdens on maritime commerce flies in the face of
the uniformity principle. The Supreme Court has already rejected
the idea that Congress might delegate its admiralty powers to the
states. In Knickerbocker, Congress attempted to permit states to
apply their own distinctive workers' compensation schemes in
maritime commerce. In Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co., e the
Court struck down a somewhat modified version of the same feder-
al statute it had previously invalidated in Knickerbocker precisely
because such a delegation would destroy uniformity." This time
Congress sought to permit states to extend their workers' compen-
sation schemes to longshoremen only, leaving injured seamen to
seek traditional admiralty remedies. The Court refused to permit
the delegation:
This cause presents a situation where there was no attempt
to prescribe general rules. On the contrary, the manifest
purpose was to permit any State to alter the maritime law
and thereby introduce conflicting requirements. To prevent
this result the Constitution adopted the law of the sea as
' Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372, 382 (1918) (quoting The
Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1874)). The negligence remedy sought by the
plaintiff in this case was eventually adopted by Congress in the Jones Act, 46 U.S.C.
app. § 688 (1994).
'6 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
,67 See supra text accompanying notes 141-42.
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the measure of maritime rights and obligations. The confu-
sion and difficulty, if vessels were compelled to comply
with the local statutes at every port, are not difficult to see.
Of course, some within the States may prefer local rules;
but the Union was formed with the very definite design of
freeing maritime commerce from intolerable restrictions
incident to such control. The subject is national. Local
interests must yield to the common welfare. The Constitu-
tion is supreme."
OPA repeats the same error. Whether the subject matter is
remedies for oil pollution or workers' compensation for longshore-
men, any federal statute that permits local regulations which alter
the liabilities of vessel owners beyond those provided for in the
federal scheme violates the principle of uniformity inherent in the
Admiralty Clause and is, thus, constitutionally infirm.
The extent of state power to impose liability for marine pollu-
tion might seem to have been settled in Askew v. American Water-
ways Operators,"6 a case in which the Supreme Court upheld a
Florida statute imposing strict and unlimited liability on those
responsible for discharges of oil in state waters. 7 ' The Court was
called upon to consider whether the unlimited liability scheme
provided for in Florida's oil pollution statute.' was permissible
under the federal Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970,
(WQIA),' the precursor to the FWPCA. As noted above, the
WQIA provided for strict but limited liability for discharges occur-
ring in the navigable waters of the United States." It also con-
tained a non-preemption clause that permitted the states to supple-
ment the remedies provided in the federal scheme: "Nothing in this
section shall be construed as preempting any State or political
subdivision thereof from imposing any requirement or liability with
respect to the discharge of oil into any waters within such
Washington v. W.C. Dawson & Co. 264 U.S. at 228.
411 U.S. 325 (1973).
'70- See id.
-. See The Oil Spill Prevention and Pollution Control Act, 1970 FLA. LAWS 70-244,
749-50 (current version at Pollutant Discharge and Control Act, FLA. STAT. ANN. §
367.09 (West 1997)).
" The Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 91 (1970) (amended by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act of 1972 (FWPCA), 86 Stat. 816 (1972) current ver-
sion at 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1994)); see also supra note 7 and accompanying text.
'"- See 33 U.S.C. § 1321(c) (1994); see also supra note 9.
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State. 174
A three-judge panel of the District Court for the Middle Dis-
trict of Florida struck down Florida's law on the grounds that it
was an "unconstitutional intrusion into the federal maritime do-
main"" and would effect the "destruction of the very uniformity
in respect to maritime matters which the Constitution was designed
to establish."'76 In so doing, the lower court rejected the argu-
ment that regulation of pollution in state waters was a purely local
concern and would not encroach on a federal interest:
[T]his is a case where the state purports to impose upon
shipping and related industries duties which under the
federal law they do not bear. It can hardly be said that
Florida is not seeking to regulate conduct in the federal
maritime jurisdiction. We need not belabor the point that to
permit the states severally to regulate these industries as
Florida seeks to do would sound the death knell to the
principle of uniformity."7
Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc., the district court also dismissed the idea
that states are permitted to fill in gaps where the federal scheme
provides no remedy. Admiralty courts, it said, are "fully capable of
fashioning a remedy for the breach of substantive duties imposed
by the general maritime law."'79 Most significantly, the district
court rejected the argument that the WQIA authorized the states to
supplement federal admiralty law in the area of marine pollution.
The court firmly rejected the idea that Congress could delegate to
the states the power to legislate in areas affecting maritime matters,
where such delegation would effectively permit the states to exer-
cise admiralty powers granted to Congress by the Constitution:
It has long been recognized that Congress is powerless to
confer on the states authority to legislate within the admi-
ralty jurisdiction and we cannot presume that W.Q.I.A. was
'T' Id. § 11(o)(2) (codified as amended at 33 U.S.C. § 1321(o)(2)).
17. American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. 1241, 1244 (M.D.
Fla. 1971), rev'd, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
" Id. at 1248, (quoting Southern Pac. Co: v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 217 (1917)).
1T. Id.
'7 398 U.S. 375 (1970) (superseded by statute) (creating a maritime wrongful death
action for deaths occurring in state waters).
' American Waterways Operators, Inc. v. Askew, 335 F. Supp. at 1248.
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an attempt to do so. There is nothing in the language of
the act which purports to grant any such legislative authori-
ty to the states. The statement that Congress did not intend
to preclude state imposed liability for oil pollution simply
means that the states are free to enforce pollution control
measures that are within their constitutional prerogative.8
The Supreme Court heard the case as a direct appeal and re-
versed in a unanimous decision. 8 ' The Court placed great empha-
sis on the fact that the Florida statute did not directly conflict with
the terms of the WQIA. This was true primarily because the
WQIA did not address remedies available to states or private par-
ties.' Florida's statute, on the other hand, addressed only damag-
es and costs incurred by non-federal interests. In the Supreme
Court's view, therefore, the Florida law was more properly consid-
ered complementary, rather than conflicting, legislation. Moreover,
in reviewing the WQIA's non-preemption clause, the Court deter-
mined that the Federal Act does not preclude, but rather invites,
state regulation.' The Court thus viewed the WQIA and the
Florida statute as forming "harmonious parts of an integrated
whole. , ,M
4
The Supreme Court's treatment of the uniformity problem is
the most intriguing part of the Askew decision. The Court asserted
that where Congress failed to evidence any intent to preempt state
action, the "issue comes down to whether a State constitutionally
may exercise its police power respecting maritime matters concur-
rently with the Federal Government."' The Court held that ab-
sent an actual conflict with a federal law, state regulation over
maritime matters is permissible even though Congress has acted in
the same area." In its view, nothing in Jensen or Knickerbocker
prevented Florida from imposing additional liabilities on vessels
' Id. at 1249 (citations omitted).
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
" See id. at 335-36:
While the Federal Act is concerned only with actual cleanup costs incurred by
the Federal Government, the State of Florida is concerned with its own cleanup
costs .... Moreover, since Congress dealt only with "cleanup" costs, it left the
States free to impose "liability" in damages for losses suffered by both the
States and by private interests.
191- See id. at 329.
Id. at 331.
Id. at 337.
I d. at 341.
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plying state waters.
What is most significant about the decision is that the Court
paid almost no attention to Knickerbocker's prohibition against
delegating the admiralty power to the states. It utilized a traditional
statutory preemption analysis,' focusing on whether there was a
conflict between state and federal interests under Jensen, but it did
not adequately address Knickerbocker, except to say that it was
"limited to its facts."
The point to bear in mind, however, is that Jensen uniformity
is not really the issue. Rather, the question is whether after
Knickerbocker Congress may allow the, states to change the sub-
stantive law of admiralty. In other words, the issue is not whether
the Florida statute or others like it conflict with the terms of a
federal admiralty statute or the general maritime law, which was
the primary concern of the court in Jensen. Instead the question is
whether Congress may abdicate its responsibility to provide for the
uniformity of the maritime law by delegating its authority to the
states. Jensen and Knickerbocker turn on two different facets of the
same uniformity principle: States may not unilaterally act to disrupt
the essential harmony of the maritime law (Jensen), but neither
may Congress surrender its obligation to provide that uniform body
of law (Knickerbocker).
In Jensen, the Supreme Court refused to permit the application
of New York's workmen's compensation statute to longshore work-
ers.' The Jensen Court held that state law could not be applied
where doing so would disturb the essential harmony of the mari-
time law. This is true even when Congress has itself failed to
fashion an appropriate remedy.'89 Jensen thus established a "dor-
mant Admiralty Clause," principle with an effect akin to the dor-
mant aspects of the Commerce Clause. 9°
In Knickerbocker, on the other hand, the Court was faced with
a congressional attempt to circumvent Jensen's holding: Rather
than fashioning a statutory remedy for longshoremen's compensa-
tion on its own, Congress simply amended the "Saving to Suitors"
"'. See supra text accompanying notes 101-05. •
20 Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 205 (1917).
" Id. at 216.
' David J. Bederman, Uniformity, Delegation and the Dormant Admiralty Clause, 28
J. MAR. L. & COM. 1 (1997) (arguing for a strong "dormant Admiralty Clause"); see also
E. Merrick Dodd, Jr., The New Doctrine of the Supremacy of Admiralty over the Common
Law, 21 COLUM. L. REv. 647 (1921) (describing the doctrine of Jensen, Knickerbocker
etc. as. novel, and discussing their effect on the law of the sea).
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Clause in the Judiciary Act19' to provide that common law reme-
dies would include "the rights and remedies under the workmen's
compensation laws of any state. ' ' " Congress intended by this
amendment to permit federal courts to apply the remedies created
by state workers' compensation laws. These remedies were to be
treated as are other common law remedies, the theory being that
such remedies are "concurrent" with the remedies available in
admiralty. In striking down the amendment, the Supreme Court
intended to prevent Congress from delegating power to regulate
maritime matters to the states, and thereby limit occasions wherein
maritime commerce would be subject to differing liabilities in
different states.93
Congress responded to this rebuke by amending the Judiciary
Act to remove longshore cases from the jurisdiction of the federal
courts.'94 The Supreme Court rejected this attempt to circumvent
Jensen in State of Washington v. Dawson.95 Here, it essentially
restated its holding in Knickerbocker, and noted that while Con-
gress might enact a general workers' compensation statute by virtue
of the powers granted it by the Admiralty Clause, it could not
delegate the task to the states."
OPA's preemption clause falls precisely within the confines of
the prohibition on delegation found in Knickerbocker and Dawson.
OPA creates a comprehensive federal compensation regime, but
"' In the first Judiciary Act, passed in 1789, Congress confirmed the jurisdiction of
the common law courts by providing that federal courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction
over admiralty claims "saving to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common law remedy,
where the common law is competent to give it." Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat.
73, 77 (1789) (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 133 (1994)). At the time Jensen was decid-
ed, the clause was essentially unchanged and granted to suitors "in all cases the right of
a common-law remedy where the common law is competent to give it." Judiciary Act of
1911, ch. 231, 36 Stat. 1087 (1911). It is said that the Savings Clause was inserted
"from an abundant caution, lest the exclusive terms in which the power is conferred on
the District Courts might be deemed to have taken away the concurrent remedy which
had before existed:' New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants' Bank, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 344, 390 (1848). The exact limits of the Savings Clause has been the subject of
extended commentary throughout the years. See Jonathan Gutoff, Admiralty, Article III,
and Supreme Court Review of State-Court Decision Making, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2169 (1996)
(discussing the Supreme Court's power to review admiralty decisions made in state
courts); David W. Robertson, Displacement of State Law by Federal Maritime Law, 26 J.
MAR L. & CoM. 325 (1995) (arguing for strong uniformity in admiralty law).
,. Judiciary Act of 1917, ch. 97, 40 Stat. 395 (1917).
M Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164. (1919).
" Act of June 10, 1922, ch. 216, 42 Stat. 634 (1922).
' 264 U.S. 219 (1924).
'9 See id. at 227-28.
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still allows states to enact other oil spill legislation.'" OPA pur-
ports to allow states merely the power to supplement the federal
compensation regime, in much the same way that common law
remedies supplement those given in admiralty. 8 Yet, OPA does
much more than that. The scope of OPA's non-preemption clause
seems to be without bound, at least with respect to liability and
compensation regimes. OPA specifically declares that neither its
own provisions nor those of the Limitation of Liability Act pre-
vents any state or political subdivision from imposing any further
liability with respect to either the discharge of oil within that state,
or any removal activities in connection with such a discharge. '"
OPA thus not only delegates authority over pollution to the states,
it also confers the same authority on counties, cities, and towns.
OPA does far more than create a problem of inconsistent state and
federal legislation; it invites the passage of a myriad of conflicting
and burdensome regulations on the part of any municipality so
inclined. In this respect at least, OPA's claim to be a comprehen-
sive oil spill regime is rendered a nullity.
Contrary to the Supreme Court's assertions in Askew, oil spill
legislation cannot be said to be merely concerned with the ship-to-
shore effects of a spill. Imposing strict and unlimited liability on
vessels responsible for oil pollution impacts on substantive admiral-
ty rights. A vessel which spills oil in a state with an unlimited
liability statute will be subject to entirely different burdens than
one which is responsible for a discharge in a state without unlimit-
ed liability. Even more bizarre is the possibility vessels might be
subject to different liability rules depending on the port within a
state. Such a result is clearly contrary to the idea that the constitu-
tional admiralty grant was designed to establish "harmonious and
uniform rules applicable throughout every part of the Union."'
Even after twenty years, Askew remains something of a riddle.
In the years since the decision, federal courts have struggled to
determine how far the states may go in regulating maritime activity
"'- See S. REP. NO. 101-94, at 6 (1990):
The theory behind the Committee action [urging approval of OPA] is that the
Federal statute is designed to provide basic protection for the environment and
victims damaged by-spills of oil. Any State wishing to impose a greater degree
of protection for its own resources and citizens is entitled to do so.
" For example, injury to a passenger aboard a vessel might be pursued both at law
and in admiralty in the same proceeding.
33 U.S.C § 2718(a) (1994).
Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 164 (1919).
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before they impermissibly interfere with the federal interest in
uniformity. 1 This is especially true in the area of marine pollu-
tion, because it is difficult to see precisely how a state might pro-
duce any meaningful prevention or compensation legislation with-
out affecting maritime conduct on the seaward side of the "twilight
zone," that area of the navigable waters where both the states and
federal government may have an interest in legislation.' Such
legislation might run afoul of Jensen if it affects a traditional mari-
time right or remedy, even where it scrupulously avoids prescribing
rules of conduct.' The problem with Askew is that it ultimately
seems to decide nothing more than the particular Florida statute at
issue in the case was not preempted because it was primarily con-
cerned with compensating private parties for "shoreside injuries by
ships on navigable waters":'
[W]e cannot say with certainty at this stage that the Florida
Act conflicts with any federal Act. We have only the ques-
tion of whether the waiver of preemption by Congress ...
concerning "the imposition by a state of any requirement or
liability" is valid.
It is valid unless the rule of Jensen and Knickerbocker
Ice is to engulf everything that Congress chose to call
"admiralty," preempting state action. Jensen and
Knickerbocker Ice have been confined to their facts, viz., to
suits relating to the relationship of vessels, plying the high
2" See In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 628, (lst Cir.
1994) ("Where substantive law is involved, we think that the Supreme Court's past deci-
sions yield no single, comprehensive test as to where harmony is required and when uni-
formity must be maintained.").
202 As is well known, until the 1948 passage of the Admiralty Extension Act, 46
U.S.C. § 740, (1994), claims for damage to land-based structures were not cognizable in
admiralty, even when the injury was caused by a vessel. See Matthew P. Harrington, Af-
ter the Flood: Cleaning Up the Test for Admiralty Jurisdiction Over Tort, 29 U.C. DAVIS
L. REV. 1, 5-7 (1995) (discussing admiralty's traditional locus test for tort jurisdiction).
The Askew Court refused, however, to find that the congressional extension of admiralty
jurisdiction was exclusive and thus carried Jensen's uniformity principle shoreward. See
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc. 411 U.S. 325, 340-44 (1973). The Court
therefore recognized the continuing validity of the "twilight zone," that area wherein state
regulation is permissible so long as it does not work material prejudice to an already-es-
tablished federal maritime interest. Davis v. Department of Labor and Industries of Wash-
ington, 317 U.S. 249, 252, 256 (1943).
2. See Maryland Department of Natural Resources v. Kellum, 51 F.3d 1220 (4th Cir.
1995) (holding state statute providing for strict liability damage to oyster beds in state
waters to be preempted by federal admiralty rule requiring fault).
Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. at 344.
[V/ol. 48:1
OPA'S DELEGATION OF POWER TO STATES
seas and our navigable waters, and to their crews. 5 .
The assertion that state legislation is permissible as long as it
is limited to the shoreside effects of a ship-to-shore injury over-
looks the reality that almost any maritime casualty, whether it be
collision, grounding, or seaman's injury, has shoreside consequenc-
es. 6 This is especially true if the legislation in question seeks to
impose strict liability for economic or intangible losses. For in-
stance, it is unlikely federal courts would uphold a state statute
imposing strict liability for economic losses arising from a collision
occurring on navigable waters within a state. On the face of it,
such legislation would seem to implicate purely local concerns; yet
it would have the effect of abrogating important concepts of fault
inherent in the maritime law of collision. 7 Askew is wrong to
the extent it lends support to the proposition that state legislation
over marine pollution is valid as long as it refrains from directly
regulating maritime conduct.
Askew's holding is ultimately of little value when considering
OPA's non-preemption clause. This is because the preemption
clause at issue in Askew said nothing about state power to abrogate
maritime rights and remedies.? State law claims under the
WQIA were subject to limitation under the Limitation of Liability
Act, in spite of the WQIA's non-preemption language. OPA goes
much further than the preemption clause involved in Askew, how-
Id. at 343-344.
See In re Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 629 (1st Cir.
1994) (noting that little would be left of the exclusive admiralty jurisdiction if some in-
tangible shoreside effect was sufficient to allow state control).
2. See The Pennsylvania, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 125 (1873) ("The liability for damages
is upon the ship whose fault caused the injury:); see also The Clara, 102 U.S. 200
(1880) (finding that the fault0 for a collision lay with a vessel anchored without a watch
on deck); The Sunnyside, 91 U.S. 208 (1875) (finding two vessels equally at fault); The
Grace Girdler, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 196 (1868) (finding fault for unreasonable adherence to
right-of-way rules); The Jumna, 149 F. 171 (2d Cir. 1906) (noting that in the absence of
a demonstration of fault on the part of either vessel involved in a collision, it was to be
presumed that both were acting lawfully).
While federal claims for cleanup costs under the statutes at issue in Askew were
not subject to limitation under the Limitation of Liability Act, state and private claims
were. Cf In re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that
owners and charterers were not entitled to limitation for claims made by the federal gov-
ernment under the CWA); In re Hokkaido Fisheries Co., Ltd., 506 F. Supp. 631 (D.
Alaska 1981) (holding that owners were not entitled to limitation for claims made by the
federal government under the CWA); In re Harbor Towing, Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150, (D.
Md. 1971) (holding that claims made by Maryland under its own laws were subject to
the Limitation of Liability statute).
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ever, and provides that state legislation will not be affected by the
Limitation of Liability Act.' It is at this point, therefore, that
Congress seems to have exceeded its authority under the constitu-
tional grant and delegated the power to make substantive admiralty
law to the states.
III. OPA's ASSAULT ON UNmFoRMrrY
The wisdom of the non-delegation principle is made manifest
by the confusion created by OPA's failure to preempt state oil spill
legislation. Indeed, the chaos created by the dizzying array of
remedies and defenses applicable to post-OPA oil pollution inci-
dents demonstrates the decision not to preempt state action was not
only a poor policy choice, but is a perfect example of why the
Supreme Court's decision in Knickerbocker was correct. Failing to
preempt state action has given rise to a situation wherein the uni-
formity of maritime law is made but an illusion. The law applica-
ble to an oil spill is now almost wholly dependent on the law of
the state in which the spill occurs.
After OPA, there are now at least four types of remedies avail-
able to injured parties, each with a different statutory or legal
basis. Each of these remedies is subject to different limitations on
liability. In addition, several defenses remain available to the ship-
owner, each of which impacts the remedies differently. A shipown-
er faced with plaintiffs seeking these various remedies might rely
on OPA's statutory limit on damages for the OPA claims, have
varying defenses available under a state statute, and assert the
Limitation of Liability Act against the admiralty and common law
claims.
Moreover, as will be seen, the decision not to preempt has also
created an entirely new procedural problem, namely the end of the
concursus, or joinder of claims into a single proceeding. After
OPA, it is unclear whether any mechanism now exists to consoli-
date claims in one forum so as to achieve an orderly and swift
adjudication. In a very real sense, OPA has unnecessarily compli-
cated the substantive and procedural aspects of oil pollution litiga-
tion.
"' 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994).
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A. The Substantive Problem: Conflicting Remedies and Defenses
1. Sorting Out the Claims
After passage of OPA, a party injured by an oil spill will be
entitled to assert claims (1) under the OPA, (2) under any applica-
ble state statute (3) in admiralty, and (4) under the common law.
a. OPA Claims
OPA claims include actions for recovery of removal costs and
damages. These must be brought within three years of the date of
the spill.2"' Because the scope of covered damages is quite broad,
OPA is seen by many as the primary avenue for the recovery for
most oil pollution claims. As noted above, it permits injured parties
to recover removal costs, property damage, economic loss, and
natural resource damages.21' At the same time, OPA's potential to
provide full recovery is limited, at least when the spill is found to
be not the result of recklessness, gross negligence, or the violation
of a federal operating or safety standard.2"2 In such a case, the
OPA claims will be subject to the statutory limits. This means in
some cases the responsible party's liability, although strict, could
be limited to an amount far less than the actual removal costs and
damages.213 If a 1,000 GRT tank barge spills oil over a large ar-
ea, its liability may be capped at $2 million, even though amounts
far in excess of that were spent in cleanup.2 4 The amount avail-
220 See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1994) (identifying covered injuries); see also id. §
2717(0 (creating three year limitation). This assumes that the responsible party has failed
to pay after being presented with the claim, and that either the plaintiff has elected not to
seek reimbursement from the OSLTF or that the OSLTF has refused to pay.
21 . 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b) (1994); see also supra text accompanying note 35.
212 33 U.S.C. § 2704(c) (1994); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
213. 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a)(1) (1994).
224. For example, on January 19, 1996, the barge North Cape grounded off the coast
of Rhode Island, spilling approximately 800,000 gallons of oil into Block Island Sound.
The North Cape had an OPA statutory limitation of $10 million, yet the owners spent $5
million cleaning up the spill. The State of Rhode Island and the United States incurred
approximately $3 million in cleanup costs. Owners paid private claimants approximately
$3.1 million for property and economic damages, and $2 million was spent on environ-
mental assessment. The full extent of environmental damages have yet to be assessed.
Thus costs and damages resulting from the spill have already exceeded the statutory limi-
tation, even before claims for environmental damage are presented. See, e.g., Odin Marine
Corp. Thor Towing Corp. & Eklof Marine Corp.'s Response to the Motions of the United
States, the State of Rhode Island and Private Third Party Claimants, 96 Civ. 5438
(S.D.N.Y. OCL 16, 1996).
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able to satisfy public and private claims might actually be even
lower, since the responsible party is permitted to offset any costs it
incurs in cleaning up the spill against its statutory limit.2 5 Hope
of full compensation from the responsible party under OPA may,
therefore, prove to be illusory in many cases. When claims are in
excess of the statutory limitation, many plaintiffs may be left to
seek compensation either from the OSLTF or in a legal proceeding
grounded in some other remedy.
b. Claims Based on State Statute
Almost all the coastal states have enacted some sort of oil
pollution legislation. 216 These statutes take a variety of forms,
provide for various forms of liability and permit recovery for a
variety of different claims. The nonuniformity in state pollution
legislation is staggering. Many states have enacted oil pollution
compensation statutes providing for strict and unlimited liability for
discharges. Some of these statutes are far broader than OPA, in
that they provide for a broader range of recoverable costs and
damages.217 Some states provide for unlimited liability, but with
types of recoverable damage more limited than under OPA.1 8
Others provide for liability limits and recoverable damages that are
almost identical to those in OPA.219 Finally, a few states have
statutes that provide for neither strict nor unlimited liability, essen-
tially leaving injured parties to use common law or admiralty rem-
edies.'
This variety in state legislation not only subjects a vessel own-
er to differing liabilities depending on the location of the spill-a
proposition that would seem to be at odds with the purposes of the
215. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704(a) (1995).
26 See supra text accompanying note 54.
227. See, e.g., The Rhode Island Environmental Injury Compensation Act, R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 46-12.5-6 (1996) (providing for strict and unlimited liability for discharges of oil
in state waters). Recoverable damages include removal costs, damage to real and personal
property, economic losses, natural resource damages, interest and attorney's fees. See id.
22' See Massachusetts Oil and Hazardous Materials Prevention Act, MASS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 21E, § 5 (West 1983) (providing for strict and unlimited liability but permitting re-
covery only for removal costs and damages to natural resources and real or personal
property); see also NJ. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-23.11g (West 1996).
29. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 30:2025(E) (West 1996).
See, e.g., 35 PA. CONS. STAT. § 691.401 (1996) (a water pollution law, permitting
the Commonwealth to maintain a nuisance action against a discharger, but providing no
specific remedies to private parties).
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admiralty grant-it permits different opportunities for recovery to
claimants. Injured parties in states with more generous compensa-
tion statutes, such as Rhode Island, which provides for strict and
unlimited liability for a wide range of damages,' may fare better
than those in states such as Pennsylvania m where a vessel
owner's liability is more limited. Where damages exceed OPA's
statutory limits, a vessel owner's liability and a plaintiffs ultimate
right to recovery are wholly dependent on the fortuity of an acci-
dent occurring in a state with a generous compensation regime.
The interaction between OPA and claims based on state legisla-
tion is complicated by this patchwork regime. One need only imag-
ine an incident involving a vessel with an OPA limit of $10 mil-
lion and cleanup costs and damages in excess of that limit to see
the effect. Assuming that neither the vessel nor the OSLTF have
paid the claim, recovery of amounts in excess of the OPA limit
will be entirely dependent on the state legislation in force. If the
state imposes strict and unlimited liability for all costs and damag-
es, a plaintiff might conceivably recover. However, a spill in a
state with a less generous recovery regime might not result in
recovery in excess of the OPA limits. The situation is even more
complicated when one factors in the types of damages that might
be at issue. Economic losses in excess of the OPA limit might be
recoverable in some states with an unlimited liability regime, but
not in others. Still other states might permit recovery for economic
losses, but only up to a specified state limit.
It is clear, therefore, that OPA's promised recovery may not
only be illusory in some cases, but it may open the claims resolu-
tion process to a great deal of confusion and uncertainty. After
OPA, vessel owner liability and claimant recovery remain a func-
tion of an inconsistent statutory regime.
c. Admiralty Claims
OPA did not abrogate the right to recover in admiralty for oil
pollution damages.' States and private individuals may, there-
fore, maintain an action in admiralty in rem 4 and in per-
2" See supra text accompanying note 54.
2a See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
22 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (1994) (savings provision).
2 See The Barnstable, 181 U.S. 464, 467 (1901). A number of early cases considered
the question of whether admiralty could give any rights in rem or in personam for oil
pollution damage. The issue was whether such damage could constitute an admiralty tort.
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sonam z to recover when oil pollution damages or interferes with
a property interest.'
There was also some question as to whether such torts could give rise to an in rem right.
Because the existence of a maritime lien is the basis for any action in rem, one of the
first questions was whether damage to property caused by oil spills could give rise to a
lien. In The Rock Island Bridge, the Court held:
There is no doubt... that the jurisdiction of the admiralty extends to all
cases of tort committed on the high seas, and in this country on navigable
waters. For the redress of these torts, the courts of admiralty may proceed in
personam, and when the cause of the injury is the subject of a maritime lien,
may also proceed in rem. The latter proceeding is the remedy afforded for the
enforcement of Hens of that character. A maritime lien, unlike a lien at com-
mon law, may, in many cases, exist without possession of the thing, upon
which it is asserted, either actual or constructive.. . . [W]hen the lien arises
from torts committed at sea, it travels with the thing, wherever that goes, and
into whosoever hands it may pass. The only object of the proceeding in rem,
is to make this right, where it exists, available-to carry it into effect. It
subserves no other purpose.
73 U.S. 213, 215 (1867).
Courts quickly determined that oil pollution damage gives rise to tort liens in
much the same way a lien would arise for injury to property by conversion. See Cali-
fomia v. S.S. Bournemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922, 927 (C.D. Cal. 1969) (citing The
Escanaba, 96 F. 252 (N.D. Ill. 1899)) (conversion by master of goods aboard vessel); The
Atlanta, 82 F. Supp. 218 (S.D. Ga. 1948) (conversion of lighter by ship's crew); The
Lydia, 1 F.2d 18 (2d Cir. 1924) (conversion of coal aboard vessel); The Minnetonka, 146
F. 509 (2d Cir. 1906) (theft of passenger's goods by crew); see also In re New Jersey
Barging Corp., 144 F. Supp. 340, 341 (S.D.N.Y. 1956) ("On the evidence in this case
there can be no question as to the negligence of the tankerman ... and the immediate
result was the oil spill. There is no issue, therefore, either in law or fact as to the in
rem liability").
2- See Salaky v. Atlas Tank Processing Corp., 120 F. Supp. 225 (E.D.N.Y. 1953)
(allowing a cause of action for damage to small boats fouled by oil sludge), rev'd on
other grounds sub nor. Salaky v. The Atlas Barge No. 3, 208 F.2d 174 (2nd Cir. 1953).
2 The only real question is the relative standing of public and private plaintiffs to
sue. It seems clear at this point that both public and private entities may maintain actions
in admiralty for damage to real or personal property. It is an altogether different question
where parties seek to recover for injury suffered by the waters themselves. Public entities
seem clearly to have a cause of action, grounded in their position as trustee of a public
right. See Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1067 (D. Md. 1972)
("[I]f the State is deemed to be the trustee of the waters, then, as trustee, the State must
be empowered to bring suit to protect the corpus of the trust-i.e., the waters-for the
beneficiaries of the trust-i.e., the public."); see also The Boumemouth, 307 F. Supp. 922
(C.D. Cal. 1968) (holding that the Admiralty Extension Act does not give the federal
courts jurisdiction to hear a claim by a state for damage to the water itself). Private
parties, on the other hand, lack standing to sue in admiralty unless they can make out
some claim akin to private nuisance. This is because admiralty has been traditionally
reluctant to recognize a cause of action for injury absent an ownership interest in the
damaged property. See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 (1927). A
private claim for injury to a public right might be successful if the claimant makes some
special commercial use of the resource, as where fishermen sue for damage to their liveli-
hoods caused by the destruction of fishing stocks. This exception is based on the tradi-
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Damages recoverable in admiralty for oil pollution are similar
to those available in other maritime tort actions. Property damage
and cleanup costs are recoverable items of damage, but recovery
for economic loss is severely limited by the Robins Dry Dock rule.
This rule holds that a plaintiff in admiralty cannot recover damages
for economic loss in the absence of some injury to person or prop-
erty.m The rule, which is frequently criticized, operates as a limit
on proximate causation, barring claims that might be considered
too remote to have been foreseeable.n
It is clear, therefore, that admiralty recognizes a maritime cause
of action in tort for damages caused by oil pollution, 9 and this
is true whether the claim involves damage to property, either real
or personal, or where the claimant seeks the costs of cleaning up a
spill." Nonetheless, it is also important to note that oil spills
will frequently give rise to admiralty claims that do not involve
damages from pollution. A grounding or collision undoubtedly will
give rise to all manner of admiralty claims, which may sound in
tort or contract. None of these ancillary claims are cognizable
under OPA or any state oil pollution statute. Maritime casualties
will create claims from cargo owners for lost cargo."' Vessels
involved in a collision may have claims for damage. 2 Seamen,
passengers, or other maritime workers will have personal injury
claims.? 3 Charterers might claim for breach of charter party.234
tional protection of fishermen as "favorites of admiralty." Union Oil Co. v. Oppen, 501
F.2d 558, 567 (9th Cir. 1974).
2" See Robins Dry Dock, 275 U.S. 303 (1927) (holding that pure economic loss was
not recoverable).
z' See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623, 623 (1st Cir. 1994)
(noting that the Robins Dry Dock rule applies to all types of "secondary" injury); cf. In
re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that the Robins
Dry Dock rule is more appropriate than a rule of foreseeability in determining what sort
of injuries give rise to liability).
29 See Ballard Shipping, 32 F.3d at 626 (holding that claims arising from pollution
may sound in maritime tort or at common law); Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252,
258 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that claims for property damage sound in maritime tort); In
re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 1114, 1141 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that an oil
spill resulting from negligent construction of a vessel gives rise to cause of action in
maritime tort).
' See Puerto Rico v. S.S. Zoe Colocotroni, 628 F.2d 652 (1st Cir. 1980) (allowing
the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico to pursue a claim for loss of value of land).
'* See In re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
See Maritrans Operating Partners v. W/V Balsa 37, 64 F.3d 150 (4th Cir. 1995)
(describing claims resulting from a collision), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 775 (1996).
See Petition of Odin Marine Corp., No. 96-CV-5438 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
See In re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd., 764 F. Supp. at 1114.
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Terminal operators will claim for damage from allision or ground-
g35
Recovery for these injuries or breaches are not provided for
either in OPA or state pollution statutes, and thus, claimants are
required to maintain actions in admiralty. Claims in admiralty,
however, are subject to admiralty defenses and procedures.
OPA's preemption of the Limitation of Liability Act was not abso-
lute. It specifically left in place traditional admiralty rights and
defenses, where damages unconnected with the pollution itself are
concerned. 7 Thus the Limitation of Liability Act survives as a
defense to admiralty claims, even though it does not apply to
claims brought under OPA's damage provisions. 8 Moreover, it
appears that the Robins Dry Dock rule may remain in force for the
same reason.
d. Common Law Claims
Maritime plaintiffs have long enjoyed the right to bring a claim
pursuant to common law in addition to any right of action they
might have had in admiralty. This right was enshrined in the first
Judiciary Act and has remained a fundamental principle of federal
civil procedure ever since. OPA makes specific provision for com-
mon law actions by "saving to suitors in all cases all other reme-
dies to which they are otherwise entitled." '239
While courts were somewhat slow to recognize common law
remedies for water pollution, at least three (and possibly four)
theories would seem to be available: These include actions for
trespass, nuisance, negligence, and strict liability.
While trespass has been recognized by the English courts as a
cause of action to recover damages for oil pollution, few, if any,
American courts have been faced with similar claims.'l The pri-
mary obstacle to a successful trespass action is the requirement that
the injured party show intent on the part of the wrongdoer.24t Un-
'" See In re Nautilus Motor Tanker Co., 900 F. Supp. 697 (D.NJ. 1995) (allowing a
berth operator a claim for pure economic damages from a grounding and resulting oil
spill).
. See infra text accompanying notes 262-75.
2 See 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (1994).
See id. § 2702.
239: Id. § 2751(e)(2).
21 See Esso Petroleum Co. v. Southport Corp. [1955] App. Cas. 218 (H.L.) (holding
lack of negligence to be a full defense in a trespass action resulting from oil damage to
a shoreline).
24,. See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEEfON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 13,
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less the pollution is intentional, as in the case of a discharge of
oily ballast, the chances of showing intent are small. 2
A nuisance action might be maintained either by the state to
abate a public nuisance or by a private citizen to recover damages
for a particularized injury 43
at 73-75 (5th ed. 1984).
. See Thomas L Post, A Solution to the Problem of Private Compensation in Oil
Discharge Situations, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 524, 527 (1974); Joseph C. Sweeney, Oil
Pollution of the Oceans, 37 FORDHAM L. REV. 155, 170-71 (1968) (discussing the re-
quirements for intent or negligence under the various formulations of the doctrine of tres-
pass).
' A public nuisance action is based on the sovereign's power to act on behalf of the
public and is akin to a strict liability action in tort. See Pennsylvania v. Barnes & Tucker
Co., 353 A.2d 471 (Pa. Comrnw. CL 1976), afftd, 371 A.2d 807 (Pa. 1977) (holding that
it was unnecessary for the Commonwealth to demonstrate negligence on the part of a
mine owner in order for it to be able to force the abatement of damage resulting from
acid runoff). It seeks the abatement of a harmful condition and the restoration of the
damaged area. See Maryland v. Amerada Hess Corp., 350 F. Supp. 1060, 1068-69 (D.
Md. 1972) (holding that Maryland could not be awarded costs of such restoration because
of the non-continuing nature of the spill made it not a nuisance). A private action to
abate or recover damages for a private nuisance is more complicated, however. A plaintiff
must assert that a particular property interest of his own has been damaged, see In re
New Jersey Barging Corp, 168 F. Supp. 925 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (allowing beach owners to
make claims for property damage), or that a public right has been impaired, causing dam-
age that is particular to him. See Burgess v. MIV Tomano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D.
Me. 1973). Specifically, a plaintiff must show an interference in the enjoyment of his or
her private property which "is substantial and unreasonable and such as would be offen-
sive and inconvenient to the normal person. . . ." KEETON Er AL., supra note 241, § 87,
at 620. Unlike a claimant in a public nuisance action, a claimant in private nuisance will
be required to show negligence, foreseeability, unlawful conduct, or lack of due care. See
Roady, supra note 10, at 370. One court has summed up the distinction this way: "[A]
private nuisance is a civil wrong based on the disturbance of rights in land while a pub-
lie nuisance is not dependent upon a disturbance of rights in land but upon an interfer-
ence with the rights of the community at large." Venuto v. Owens-Coming Fiberglas
Corp., 99 Cal. Rptr. 350, 355 (Cal. CL App. 1971).
Parties who have suffered damage to shoreside property are entitled to recover for
the costs of cleanup, restoration, and even "for such annoyance, inconvenience and dis-
comfort that might be suffered. See In re New Jersey Barging Corp, 168 F. Supp. at
937 (allowing claims for bad smells, flies, etc.). In some unusual cases, moreover, recov-
ery is available when the injury is to a public right or property interest. An example of
the latter type of private nuisance claim is one brought by fishermen to recover lost in-
come or wages; recovery is permitted because fishermen are said to have an established
business making a commercial use of the public right with which the defendant interferes.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821C(1) (1977). A "private individual can re-
cover in tort for invasion of a public right only if he has suffered damage particular to
him-that is, damage different in kind, rather than simply in degree, from that sustained
by the public generally." Burgess v. M/V Tamano, 370 F. Supp. 247, 250 (D. Me. 1973).
In Venuto v. Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp, the California Supreme Court held:
Where the nuisance alleged is not also a private nuisance as to a private indi-
vidual he does not have a cause of action on account of a public nuisance
1997]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
An action in negligence is perhaps the most viable cause of
action at common law for damages resulting from oil spills. In
order to be successful, the plaintiff will be required to show the
vessel owner has some duty with respect to the plaintiff and some
act amounting to a breach of that duty resulted in damage to the
plaintiff's interests. All the difficulties attendant with proof in
claims for land-based torts are magnified in oil spill cases. This is
primarily because of the rule that a vessel owner's duty of care is
determined by resort to the principles of maritime law.'
Finally, one other theory that might support a common law
claim for oil pollution is strict liability for ultra-hazardous activi-
ties. Admittedly this theory is as yet undeveloped, but at least one
court has held that a motor carrier's transportation of large quanti-
ties of gasoline is an ultra-hazardous activity.245 The rationale for
the decision was that "[in many respects hauling gasoline as
freight is no more unusual, but more dangerous, than collecting
water. When gasoline is carried as cargo-as distinguished from
fuel for the carrier vehicle-it takes on uniquely hazardous char-
acteristics, as does water impounded in large quantities."
unless he alleges facts showing special injury to himself in person or property
of a character different in kind from that suffered by the general public. Under
this rule the requirement is that the plaintiff's damage be different in kind,
rather than in degree, from that shared by the general public.
99 Cal. Rptr. at 355 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted). As a result, courts have
been content to recognize the right of fishermen to recover in private nuisance for dam-
age to the fishing stocks, while at the same time limiting the right of pleasure boat own-
ers to recover simply because their rights to navigation have been impaired. The latter
situation is not thought to involve a loss different in kind from that suffered by the pub-
lic in general. See Oppen v. Aetna Ins. Co., 485 F.2d 252, 259-60 (9th Cir. 1973).
2" In Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, the First Circuit commented that:
Whether a state claim is litigated it a federal court or a state forum, "the
extent to which a state law may be used to remedy maritime injuries is con-
strained by the so-called 'reverse-Erie' doctrine, which requires that the substan-
tive remedy afforded by the States conform to governing federal maritime stan-
dards."
32 F.3d 623, 626 (1st Cir 1994) (quoting Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S.
207, 223 (1986)); see also Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 358 U.S.
625 (1959) (holding that the duty of care owed a guest on a berthed vessel is determined
by federal maritime law); Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953) (holding that the
liability rules governing injuries suffered by a carpenter at work on a berthed vessel are
those of maritime law).
24 See Siegler v. Kuhlman, 502 P.2d 1181, 1187 (Wash. 1972).
Id. at 1184.
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2. Applying the Defenses
After OPA, a vessel which discharges oil into navigable waters
within a state is subject to a variety of differing obligations. As
noted in the previous section, claimants might make out claims
under OPA for removal costs and damages up to the statutory
limit.O7 Amounts in excess of those recoverable under the federal
statute might be recoverable under a state statute. But, because
such statutes provide for differing levels of recovery, a vessel
owner's liability will differ depending on the statute, in force in a
particular state.2 Where both the federal and statutory regimes
are inadequate, or where the claim is not cognizable under an oil
pollution statute, a party might also make out a claim in admiralty
or at common law for damages.4 9
While this scheme appears to provide a broad right of recov-
ery, it also results in some confusion. OPA creates a complex array
of liabilities that are met by an equally complex array of defenses.
Moreover, even where the vessel lacks a complete defense, it may
still limit its liability for damage in various ways, again depending
on the cause of action being asserted. Keeping the claims, defens-
es, and limitations all straight requires the dexterity of a juggler.
a. Defenses to the Statutory Claims
OPA provides several defenses to liability. Under the federal
statute, a responsible party may be relieved of liability where it can
show that the spill was the result of an act of God, act of war, or
the act or omission of a third party." The limited nature of the
third party defense,"5 along with the improbability that a party
will be able to show that a spill was the result of an act of God or
act of war, mean that there is very little possibility of escaping
liability under OPA. Nonetheless, while liability may be strict,
liability under OPA is not unlimited. A responsible party will still
be able to take advantage of the limit on damages provided in the
statute 25
State statutes also provide defenses to liability, and these are as
24. See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
, See supra text accompanying notes 221-22.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 239-54.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2703 (1994).
" See supra notes 31-33 and accompanying text
See supra text accompanying note 54.
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variable as the statutes themselves. Some provide almost no defens-
es, to the point of requiring a responsible party even to show that
the spill was the result of an act of God which could not have
been guarded against. 3 Others provide defenses for acts of God,
acts of war, negligent or criminal acts of third parties, sabotage,
and negligent acts on the part of govemments." Some states
contain monetary caps on liability, while others impose unlimited
liability.
With respect to statutory claims, therefore, different defenses to
liability may be asserted, and different limits on liability are im-
posed. Statutory rights of action are wholly dependent on the loca-
tion of the spill.
b. Defenses to Admiralty and Common Law Claims
In drafting OPA, Congress was intent on preventing the Limita-
tion of Liability Act from being used to limit recovery, at least
where statutory claims are at issue. OPA thus repeals the Limita-
tion of Liability Act with respect to "any additional liability or
requirement" imposed by the states.' Congress did not, however,
undertake a repeal of the Limitation of Liability Act with respect
to other claims. Thus, a vessel owner may assert a right to exoner-
ation or limitation under the 1851 Act for claims not based on
statute. At the same time, Congress made no provision for the
repeal of the Robins Drydock rule, except to provide a federal
statutory remedy for recovery of economic loss. As a result, both
the Limitation of Liability Act and the Robins Drydock rule may
be applicable to bar claims brought in admiralty or at law.
(i) The Limitation of Liability Act
The Shipowner's Limitation of Liability Act" 6 was enacted in
1851, to encourage shipbuilding and the investment of money in
the shipping industry. 7 The Act provides that "the liability of
the owner of any vessel, whether American or foreign .... for any
act, matter, or thing, loss or damage, or forfeiture, done, occa-
25. See ALASKA STAT. §§ 46.03.758, .760 (Michie 1996).
See OR. REv. STAT. § 468B.305 (1995).
2 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994).
2.6 Act of March 3, 1851, ch. 43, 9 Stat. 635 (1851) (codified at 46 U.S.C. §§ 181-
89).
'." See Flink v. Paladini, 279 U.S. 59, 62 (1929).
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sioned or incurred, without the privity or knowledge of such owner
or owners, shall not ... exceed the amount or value of the interest
of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pending. ' '2"s It
creates a procedure whereby the vessel owner may petition the
federal district court for limitation and deposit a sum equal to the
value of the vessel and pending freight with the court for the satis-
faction of all claims. All proceedings against the owners are stayed
pending disposition of the limitation petition" 9 A single forum is
then used to determine (1) whether the vessel and its owner are
liable at all, (2) whether the owner may in fact limit its liability to
the value of the vessel, (3) the amount of the claims, and (4) how
the fund should be distributed.
Until the passage of OPA, the Limitation of Liability Act was
routinely applied to claims for pollution damages. After OPA,
it remains a viable defense to any common law or admiralty claim.
This is because OPA's non-preemption clause 6' is evidently in-
tended only to exempt statutory actions for pollution damages.
OPA's savings clause, provides that OPA does not affect the gen-
eral maritime law, other than as is set forth in the preemption
clause:
2751. Savings provision
(e) Admiralty and maritime law.
Except as otherwise provided in this Act, this Act
46 U.S.C app. § 183(a) (1994). The term "owner" is defined broadly to include
both those who hold legal title to the vessel as well as demise and bareboat charterers. It
does not include time or voyage charterers, however. See 46 U.S.C app. § 186 (1994);
see also In re Amoco Transp. Co., 1979 A.M.C. 1017 (N.D. MI1. 1979); In re Barracuda
Tanker Corp., 281 F. Supp. 228 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (holding that a time charterer is proba-
bly not an owner for the purposes of the Limitation of Liability Act).
29- See 46 U.S.C. app. § 185 (1994). This means a calculation based on the value of
the vessel at the end of the voyage. See, e.g., In re Barracuda Tanker Corp., 281 F.
Supp. at 232 (finding the value of the vessel after the casualty to be equivalent to one
$50 lifeboat).
' A number of decisions have held that the Limitation of Liability Act is also inap-
plicable to damages under other pollution statutes. See In re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd., 764 F.
Supp. 1114 (S.D. Tex. 1990) (holding that a shipowner is not entitled to limitation of
CWA claims made by the U.S. government); In re The Glacier Bay, 741 F. Supp. 800
(D. Alaska 1990) (holding that the Limitation of Liability Act is repealed as to Trans-
Alaska pipeline oil by TAPAA), affd, 944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a).
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does not affect-
(1) admiralty and maritime law; or
(2) the jurisdiction of the district courts of the
United States with respect to civil actions under
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, saving to
suitors in all cases all other remedies to which
they are otherwise entitled.2'
The Limitation of Liability Act survives to the same extent that
admiralty and common law claims survive OPA, because limitation
is a right and a defense granted by the maritime law. The savings
clause, when read in conjunction with the preemption clause, re-
veals that OPA was not intended to abrogate the Limitation of
Liability Act except with respect to the liability of a responsible
party for claims asserted under OPA or a state statute. Nothing else
in OPA indicates a congressional intent to effect a total repeal of
the right to limitation. 3
It is true that OPA contains a number of prohibitions on the
use of the Limitation of Liability Act. It prevents limitation as to
claims by the United States, and it also prohibits a responsible
party from relying on the Limitation of Liability Act as a defense
to actions under OPA itself, regardless of the person or entity
bringing the claim.' OPA also abrogates the Limitation of Lia-
bility Act's provisions in cases wherein states have imposed addi-
tional or unlimited liability.' OPA's repeal of the Limitation of
2. 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (1994).
'0 See William M. Duncan, The Oil Pollution Act of 1990's Effect on the
Shipowners' Limitation of Liability Act, 5 U.S.F. MAR. LJ. 303, 314 (1993):
[It would be nonsensical for Congress to selectively repeal the Limitation of
Liability Act in various provisions if it intended to repeal the Act in its entire-
ty. Furthermore, there is no indication in OPA itself, or its legislative history,
to suggest that Congress intended to wholly repeal the Limitation of Liability
Act
OPA provides that "[n]otwithstanding any other provision or rule of law . . . each
responsible party . . . is liable for . . . the removal costs and damages . . . that result
from such incident." 33 U.S.C. § 2702(a). This interpretation is supported by the language
of the legislative history: "Liability under [OPA] is established notwithstanding any other
provision or rule of the law. This means that the liability provisions of this Act would
govern compensation for removal costs and damages notwithstanding any limitation under
existing statutes such as the Act of March 3, 1851 [The Limitation of Liability
Act]. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 101-63, at 103 (1990), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 779,
781.
2 33 U.S.C. § 2718(c) (1994) provides:
Nothing in this chapter, the Act of March 3, 1851 [The Limitation of Liability
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Liability Act is not complete, however. OPA does not affect the
right of a responsible party to limit liability where the claim is
brought under the general maritime law.26 Thus, where a claim is
brought under a maritime tort theory, a vessel owner should be
able to raise the Limitation of Liability Act as a defense. Such
cases are most likely to arise in situations where a state has not
enacted an unlimited liability statute.'
(ii) Robins Drydock and Limits on Economic Loss
Admiralty has traditionally prevented plaintiffs from asserting a
right to recovery for purely economic losses in the absence of any
damage to person or a property interest.' This rule, first an-
nounced in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint , functions
as a rule of proximate cause, foreclosing recovery for damages
remote from the incident giving rise to the tortY The Robins
Dry Dock rule has been used to severely limit claims for purely
economic loss on a number of occasions. It has been invoked to
prevent seafood restaurants and bait shops from recovering lost
profits after a chemical spill closed off fishing grounds in the
Mississippi River Gulf outlet." It has also been used to prevent
recovery of damages incurred by ships unable to unload cargo
because shipping lanes were closed by an oil spill"n or colli-
Act] ... shall in any way affect, or be construed to affect, the authority of
the United States or any State...
(1) to impose additional liability or additional requirements; or
(2) to impose, or to determine the amount of, any fine or penalty
(whether criminal or civil in nature) for any violation of law ...
See also id. § 2718(a) (OPA's non-preemption clause).
2"' See 14 § 2751(e) (OPA's admiralty and maritime law savings provision).
2'7 See Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32 F.3d 623 (1st Cir. 1994) (holding
that exoneration was available to defeat shellfish dealers' claims for purely economic
loss); In re Lloyd's Leasing, Ltd., 764 F. Supp. 1114, 1141-42 (S.D. Tex. 1991) (holding
that shipowners' lack of knowledge of the unseaworthy condition of a vessel entitled them
to limitation); In re Harbor Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp. 1150, (D. Md. 1971) (holding
that because the owner was not in privity, a challenge to a limitation must fail although
tug and barge were negligent in discharging oil into Baltimore harbor).
'a See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303, 308-309 (1927).
269 id.
"" See Louisiana ex reL Guste v. WV Testbank, 752 F.2d 1019, 1032 (5th Cir. 1985)
("Denying recovery for pure economic losses is a pragmatic limitation on the doctrine of
foreseeability, a limitation we find to be both workable and useful.').
' See id. at 1021. Claims of fishermen were to allowed to proceed, as they enjoy a
special status in admiralty. See id. at 1027.
m See Barber Lines A/S v. W/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d 50, 50, 56-57 (lst Cir.
1985).
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sion. 3 Although the rule is admittedly arbitrary in nature, it is
motivated by a desire to prevent unbounded or unlimited exposure,
and thus to decrease the likelihood that socially beneficial activity
will be impeded by unlimited liability. The concern is that "liabili-
ty for pure financial harm, insofar as it is proved vast, cumulative
and inherently unknowable. in amount, could create incentives that
are perverse."'274
The Robins Dry Dock rule is thus likely to be applied in any
admiralty action arising in conjunction with OPA. This is so be-
cause OPA arguably only repeals Robins as to OPA claims and as
to claims brought pursuant to state statutesY5 OPA does not ad-
dress Robins Dry Dock as it affects common law claims or claims
brought in admiralty because, by its own terms, OPA does not
affect admiralty and maritime lawY6
B. The Procedural Problem: Concursus or No?
The difficulties for uniformity created by OPA's preemption
clause are magnified when one considers the problem of the tradi-
tional right to a "concursus" of claims in an admiralty limitation
proceeding. In abrogating the Limitation of Liability Act-whether
r See In re Kinsman Transit Co., 388 F.2d 821 (2d Cir. 1968).
= Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Maru, 764 F.2d at 55.
" See 33 U.S.C. § 2702(b)(2)(E); cf. Ballard Shipping Co. v. Beach Shellfish, 32
F.3d 623, 630-31 (finding that the passage of OPA tips balance in favor of non-preemp-
tion of the Rhode Island statute allowing recovery for pure economic damages). But cf. In
re Cleveland Tankers, Inc., 791 F. Supp. 669, 678-679 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (holding that
claims for pure economic loss are not made cognizable by § 2702(b)(2)(E)). For more in-
formation on this issue, see McCurdy, supra note 62, at 444.
- 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (1994) (OPA's savings provision). This seems to be the case
notwithstanding several decisions in the Ninth Circuit, which had held that Robins was
effectively repealed by the Trans-Alaska Pipeline Authorization Act with respect to spills
coming within its provisions. In Slavin v. BP America, Inc., 786 F. Supp. 853 (C.D. Cal.
1992), a federal district court in California held that TAPAA repealed Robins both with
respect to claims for damage caused by Trans-Alaska pipeline oil brought under TAPAA's
provisions and with respect to claims under common law. See also In re Exxon Valdez,
767 F. Supp. 1509, 1514 (D. Alaska 1991) (holding that Robins limits claims for amounts
above TAPAA's liability cap); In re The Glacier Bay, 746 F. Supp. 1379 (D. Alaska
1990) (holding that "the plain language and purpose" of the TAPAA repealed Robins),
affd, 944 F.2d 577 (9th Cir. 1991). The basis of these decisions was TAPAA's use of
the phrase "[n]otwithstanding the provisions of any other law. . . ." in 43 U.S.C.
§ 1653(c)(1). It was held that this phrase indicated an intent to end the applicability of
Robins and the Limitation of Liability Act to Trans-Alaska Pipeline incidents. Compare In
re The Glacier Bay, 944 F.2d 577, 581 (9th Cir. 1991) (upholding lower court, but bas-
ing decision on "implicit repeal" of the Limitation of Liability Act by TAPAA, rather
than "notwithstanding" language) with the cases just cited.
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completely or partially-Congress neglected to provide a means by
which all claims from an oil spill could be resolved in a single
forum. Uniformity of the maritime law is, thus, impaired because
some claims may be subject to the concursus, while others may
not. This increases the possibility a vessel owner will be subject to
inconsistent judgments.
1. The Benefits of a Single Forum
Notwithstanding the criticism directed at its substantive provi-
sions,' the Limitation of Liability Act has long been relied upon
to provide a single forum in which to adjudicate all claims arising
from a maritime casualty. Limitation involves a special proceeding,
which is initiated by the petitioner and controlled by the Limitation
of Liability Act itself and Rule F of the Supplemental Admiralty
Rules. Proceedings in limitation are, at least in form, defensive
. The City of Norwich, 118 U.S. 486 (1886) (Matthews, J., in a dissent appearing
after the opinion of the Court in The Great Western) (stating that the statute as it has
been construed puts a "premium on ... destruction [of property] by taking away from the
shipowners a principal motive for regarding either their own or the interests of others").
' The limitation petition is filed in admiralty in the district court. See FED. R. Ctv.
P., SuPp. R. FOR ADMIRALTY AND CERTAIN MARITIME CLAIMS, F(9). Venue is proper in
any district where the vessel has been attached or arrested or, if there is no attachment or
arrest, in any district where the owner has been sued. See id. If no suit is yet pending, a
petition may be filed in any district where the vessel is present. See In re Connecticut
Nat'l Bank v. Omni Corp., 687 F. Supp. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding that suit was
proper in New York even though the accident occurred in Hawaii). If the vessel is not
present in any district (either because it is lost, or in a foreign port), a complaint for
limitation is proper in any district. See In re Bowoon Sangsa Co. v. Micronesia Indem.
Corp., 720 F.2d 595 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that suit was proper in the District of
Guam when the vessel was located in Korea and no suits were pending in the U.S. prop-
er).
A petition for limitation must be filed within six months after the owner has re-
ceived notice of a claim. See 46 U.S.C. app. § 185 (1994). Notice of a claim is usually
by service of suit papers, but it may also be asserted by a simple letter. See In re Allen
N. Spooner & Sons, 148 F. Supp. 181 (S.D.N.Y. 1956), affd, 253 F.2d 584 (2d Cir.
1958); see also In re Okeanos Ocean Research Found., Inc., 704 F. Supp. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1989) (holding that written notice need not be in any particular form). If a vessel owner
receives notice of a claim that by itself does not exceed the value of a vessel, but is
aware of other claims that will cause the value to be exceeded, the six month period be-
gins to run with notice of the first claim. See Hebert v. Exxon Corp., 674 F. Supp. 1234
(E.D. La. 1987); see also In re Big Deal, Inc., 765 F. Supp. 227 (D. Md. 1991). This
time bar is absolute as to the federal cause of action and cannot be extended by includ-
ing the defense of limitation in an answer to a complaint. See In re Bayview Charter
Boats, Inc., 692 F. Supp. 1480 (E.D.N.Y. 1989). Limitation will be dismissed as to all
claimants if it is filed too late with respect to the first claimant. See In re United States
Lines, 616 F. Supp. 315 (S.D.N.Y. 1985). Limitation may, however, be a viable defense
to an action brought in state court regardless of the six month time limit. See Langnes v.
Greene, 282 U.S. 531 (1931).
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in nature and are initiated in response to the threat of claims. The
filing of a limitation petition results in a concursus of claims in a
single forum. The concursus is designed to bring about the most
effective resolution of a multiplicity of claims. By bringing all
claims into a single forum, claimants obtain a just and speedy
resolution of their claims, and vessel owners are protected against
inconsistent judgments. 9
2. Obtaining a Concursus of Claims After OPA
A number of courts and commentators contend that OPA has
effected a comprehensive repeal of the Limitation of Liability
Act.' As a result, the reasoning goes, there is no basis for per-
Upon the filing of a petition, a vessel owner will be required to post a bond as
security "for the benefit of claimants" in an amount "equal to the amount or value of the
owners' interest in the vessel and pending freighL" FED. R. Civ. P., STP. R. FOR ADMI-
RALTY AND CERTAIN MARmmE CLAIMS, F(i). The court will then issue an injunction
staying all proceedings against the owner in connection with the incident in question. See
FED. R. Crv. P., SuTp,. R. FOR ADMIRALTY AND CERTAIN MARrrimE CLAIMS, F(3); In re
Paradise Holdings, 619 F. Supp. 21 (D. Haw. 1984), affd, 795 F.2d 756, (9th Cir. 1986).
The court will also establish a monition period during which all claimants must file their
respective claims. Claims not filed during this period are subject to default. The court
does have discretion, however, to set both the initial monition period and to admit late-
filed claims to the concursus. See PEm. R. Civ. P., Sup. R. FOR ADmRALTY AND CER-
TAIN MARnTIME CLAIMS, F(4)-(6); American Commercial Lines, Inc. v. United States, 746
F.2d 1351 (8th Cir. 1984), vacated in part on other grounds, 781 F.2d 114 (8th Cir.
1985); In re Sause Bros. Ocean Towing, 1992 A.M.C. 1869 (D. Or. 1992). All claims are
then disposed of in a single proceeding. A claimant may be permitted to continue suit in
state court in certain limited situations. See Lake Tankers Corp. v. Henn, 354 U.S. 147
(1957) (allowing suit to proceed in state court when the claim was not in admiralty,
when it was undisputed that the value of the value of the vessel was greater than the
value of the claims).
9 The Supreme Court has stated:
In promulgating the rules... this Court expressed its deliberate judgment as
to the proper mode of proceeding on the part of shipowners for the purpose of
having their rights under the act declared and settled by the definitive decree of
a competent court, which should be binding on all parties interested, and pro-
tect the ship owners [sic] from being harassed by litigation in other tribu-
nals .... The questions to be settled by the statutory proceedings being, first,
whether the ship or its owners are liable at all ... and, secondly, if liable,
whether the owners are entitled to a limitation of liability, must necessarily be
decided by the district court having jurisdiction of the case; and, to render its
decision conclusive, it must have entire control of the subject to the exclusion
of other courts and jurisdictions. If another court may investigate the same
questions at the same time, it may come to a conclusion contrary to that of
the district court; and if it does . . . the proceedings in the district court will
be thwarted and rendered ineffective to secure the ship owners [sic] the benefit
of the statute.
Providence & New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578, 594-95 (1883).
2. See, e.g., In re Jabre Spray H K/S, 1997 A.M.C. 845 (D.NJ. 1996) (holding that
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mitring a concursus of claims. This is the case even where there
are non-OPA admiralty claims resulting from an oil spill." The
effect of such a holding, however, is the very real potential for
multiple, inconsistent judgments being rendered in connection with
a single casualty.
Courts faced with this question in recent years have almost
uniformly held that OPA does not require that all claims be joined
in a single proceeding. The result has been that parties with claims
arising from a spill are entitled to bring actions in different forums
at different times. In In re Jahre Spray II KIS, a federal district
court in New Jersey recently dismissed a vessel owner's petition
for limitation and lifted its injunction against prosecuting pollution
claims in other courts.8 The court also claimed that it lacked the
authority not only to enjoin suits brought under OPA, but to con-
sider any claims brought under federal, state, or common laws that
were related to the spill.8 At the same time, claims for non-pol-
lution damages, which included a claim for damage to a dock and
a claim for breach of charter party, were held to be subject to a
concursus.8
The basis of the court's holding was that OPA was intended to
encompass all claims resulting from an oil spill. In the court's
view, this meant that the Limitation of Liability Act is inapplicable
to any claim for oil pollution damage, regardless of the underlying
legal basis of the claim. This view requires an overly broad read-
ing of OPA's preemption clause, since that clause seems to apply
only to statutory claims.8 5 Under the FWPCA, the Limitation of
Liability Act had served as a barrier to state statutory liability.8




See id. The limitation plaintiffs requested dismissal of the petition rather than
continuation with only two minor claims. See id.
See 33 U.S.C. § 2718(a) (1994).
See Steuart Transp. Co v. Allied Towing Corp., 596 F.2d. 609 (4th Cir. 1979)
(limiting a barge owner's liability for costs of federal cleanup of an oil spill under the
FWPCA to twenty-five percent of the cost where there was no willful negligence on the
owner's part); In re Allied Towing Corp., 478 F. Supp. 398 (E.D. Va. 1979) (limiting lia-
bility for oil spill cleanup costs under the FWPCA to costs incurred by the federal gov-
ernment, and excluding costs incurred by the state government); In re Oswego Barge
Corp., 439 F. Supp. 312 (E.D.N.Y. 1977) (applying the Limitation of Liability Act to a
New York statute imposing strict liability); In re Harbor Towing Corp., 335 F. Supp.
1150 (D. Md. 1971) (holding that the Limitation of Liability Act applied to an action
under a Maryland statute which gave the state a cause of action for the costs of oil spill
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Congress, therefore, clearly sought to eliminate that barrier, but
there is nothing in the legislative history to demonstrate any intent
to abrogate the Limitation of Liability Act with respect to all caus-
es of action. On the contrary, the fact that Congress later sought to
preserve traditional admiralty rights in the Savings Clause indicates
that it envisioned a partial repeal.' Moreover, if, as the court
says, OPA truly was intended to encompass all claims resulting
from an oil spill, it is hard to see how permitting a concursus of
the admiralty claims while rejecting consolidation of pollution
damage claims would encourage the rapid and equitable resolution
of claims." s
If OPA does, in fact, repeal the Limitation of Liability Act, it
must also withdraw the procedural right to a concursus of claims
as well. The result seems to be, then, that oil spill cases will soon
degenerate into a free-for-all, a race to the courthouse, in which
multiple claimants will be able to maintain multiple suits against
the vessel owner for the same accident. Shipowners will, therefore,
be required to defend different actions in different fora, all the
while facing the threat of inconsistent judgments.
cleanup expenses).
" See 33 U.S.C. § 2751(e) (1994).
One means of getting around the problem is through a very liberal reading of Rule
F of the Supplemental Admiralty Rules. This Rule provides that any vessel owner may
file a petition for limitation where the right to limitation is given pursuant to statute. FED.
R. Civ. P., Supp. RumES FOR CERTAIN ADMIRALTY AND MAnrrmE CLAIMS, F(1). The
failure of the rule to confine the right to limitation explicitly to proceedings under the
Limitation of Liability Act may mean that a vessel owner is permitted to obtain a concur-
sus because OPA does provide a kind of right to limitation, albeit not one confined to
the value of the vessel and her freight then pending. See 33 U.S.C. § 2704 (1994); 46
U.S.C. app. § 183(a) (1994) ("The liability of the owner . . . shall not . . . exceed the
amount or value of the interest of such owner in such vessel, and her freight then pend-
ing.").
Adopting such a solution would require taLking the position that the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure in themselves confer substantive ights-a concept at odds with the pro-
visions of the Rules Enabling Act-unless the concursus is regarded as a procedural right
applicable to any federal statute which gives a right to limitation. See 28 U.S.C. §
2072(b) (1994) ("Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right.
All laws in conflict with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules
have taken effect."). Such an interpretation would seem to assume that Congress intended
to expand the procedural right beyond cases arising under the Limitation of Liability Act.
There is very little support in the record for this assumption, however.
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IV. CONCLUSION
It is commonly thought that oil spill legislation prior to OPA
had two great failings. The first was that none of the legislation
provided adequate limits of liability. The second centered on the
lack of any statutory remedy available to states or private parties.
In many respects, OPA corrected these deficiencies and achieved
the goals of real legislative reform. OPA expanded the remedies
for oil pollution both by increasing the classes of parties entitled to
seek a remedy and by broadening the types of damages that might
be recoverable. OPA also attempted a delicate balance, permitting
expanded recovery while at the same time avoiding the possibility
that responsible vessel operators would be driven out of the market
by potentially crushing liability.
Yet, in drafting OPA's non-preemption clause, Congress ap-
pears to have been working at cross purposes with itself. Having
settled upon a scheme to impose strict, but limited, liability, Con-
gress then undercut the uniformity of the oil pollution regime by
permitting the states to impose additional liabilities. It further exac-
erbated the problem by abrogating the Limitation of Liability Act
with respect to those liabilities. The result is an oil pollution stat-
ute that is neither comprehensive nor uniform, and quite probably
unconstitutional.
Allowing states to supplement the limited liability regime creat-
ed by OPA works material prejudice to the essential harmony of
the federal oil pollution regime. The problem is not that Congress
chose to abrogate the Limitation of Liability Act. There seems little
doubt that Congress could have done so and still preserved the
constitutional requirement of uniformity. Rather, the problem is that
having expressed a preference for a regime that imposes strict
liability but limits recoverable damages, 9 Congress cannot be
permitted to upset that balance by permitting states to enact non-
uniform legislation. The result is that vessel owners are now sub-
ject to inconsistent statutory liabilities, liability in excess of that
provided for in Robins Dry Dock, and the possibility of a multi-
plicity of suits with the threat of inconsistent judgments.
It is important to bear in mind that the issue is not one of
preemption. None of the problems discussed above result from a
" Cf United States v. Dixie Carriers, Inc., 627 F.2d 736, 739 (5th Cir. 1980) (dis-
cussing Congressional intent in creating a similar liability scheme under the FWPCA).
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conflict between state and federal law. Rather, they result from the
fact that Congress has unconstitutionally chosen to delegate its
exclusive power to legislate over maritime affairs. One commenta-
tor ably summed up the problem, arguing that "[t]he Framers in-
tended that the Courts and Congress would work together in pre-
serving the intended uniformity of the national maritime law, leav-
ing the states the power to develop those legal areas that did not
directly impinge on the national interest."2 ° In abdicating its re-
sponsibility to provide a uniform national admiralty policy, Con-
gress has created a confusing and contradictory statutory regime.
Because it does not preempt supplemental state legislation, OPA is
truly a "missed opportunity" to make some good of the "emotional
reaction to the Exxon Valdez disaster."29' It is a decision which
the courts would do well to reject.
' Bederman, supra note 190, at 35.
291. Swanson, supra note 127, at 407.
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